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Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered:* The Courts and
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Ten Years Later
Margit Livingston**
Almost a decade has elapsed since the last major revision of Arti-
cle 9 (Secured Transactions) of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") went into effect in most states. Article 9, perhaps because
of its sheer complexity, has been the most frequently litigated and the
most frequently revised of all the U.C.C. articles. The drafters hoped
that the 2001 revision would modernize Article 9 to fit a changing
economic landscape and would resolve some vexing issues that had
befuddled courts interpreting the old law. Now, almost ten years
later, the case law reveals that despite the many improvements in the
2001 revision, Article 9 still perplexes the courts in various ways.
This Article presents a survey of secured transactions cases decided
in the last couple of years that reveal a judiciary struggling to put
meaning to the statutory language. This recent case law spans several
different Article 9 topics, including, among others, the timeworn is-
sues of secured transactions disguised as leases, the requisites for a
valid financing statement, and priorities among competing claimants.
In addition, this Article provides some reflections on best practices for
counsel setting up secured transactions for their creditor clients. Fi-
nally, this Article previews some of the new amendments to Article 9
promulgated in 2010 as an anticipated solution to a number of ongo-
ing problematic questions under the statute.'
* LORENZ HART & RICHARD RODGERS, Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered, on PAL JOEY
(Columbia Records 1941).
** Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The author is grateful for the
thoughtful research assistance provided by DePaul law student Neil Kelley.
1. For the text of the 2010 amendments, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 (July 2010),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllarchives/ulc/ucc9/2Ol0am-approved.pdf. All references to Article
9 will be to the amended 2010 version unless otherwise indicated. Much of the 2001 version of
Article 9 remains untouched by the 2010 amendments; significant changes between the 2001 and
2010 versions will be highlighted by the addition of the parenthetical "2001" or "amended 2010"
to the statutory citation.
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1. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9: TRUE LEASES VS. DISGUISED
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to any "transac-
tion, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal
property or fixtures by contract."' 2 Thus, Article 9 covers all consen-
sual security interests in chattels and fixtures unless one of the statu-
tory exceptions applies.3 The term "security interest" is itself defined
in Article 1 as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation."4
Despite the seeming simplicity of this definition, one type of trans-
action has confounded courts for many years-the secured transaction
disguised as a lease. True leases are not subject to Article 9, and true
lessors do not need to file Article 9 financing statements or otherwise
comply with Article 9.5 But for various business and tax reasons, pur-
ported lessors often create leases with their customers that, beneath
the surface, look suspiciously like classic secured transactions.6 For
decades, both the Code drafters and the courts have struggled to find
the proper dividing line between transactions that are properly de-
nominated true leases and those that are really disguised Article 9
transactions.7 A recent decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals,
2. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1). In addition to this catchall category of transactions, Article 9 now
covers certain specific transactions that either were excluded from earlier versions of the statute
or are included for policy reasons although they do not fit the classic notion of a secured transac-
tion. In the former category are transactions involving agricultural liens and consignments. Id.
§ 9-109(a)(2), (4). In the latter are transactions involving sales of accounts, chattel paper, prom-
issory notes, or payment intangibles. Id. § 9-109(a)(3). Agricultural liens are the first noncon-
sensual security interests to be included within Article 9. Although case law previously applied
Article 9 to certain types of "security" consignments, consignments were not specifically in-
cluded within Article 9 until the 2001 revision. Sales of accounts, chattel paper, promissory
notes, or payment intangibles are included within the statute even though they do not involve
"security interests" in the classic sense because of the difficulty experienced by third parties in
determining whether certain assets of the debtor have been sold or merely given as collateral.
See id. § 9-109 cmt. 4.
3. See U.C.C. § 9-109(c) (providing for preemption of Article 9 by certain federal and state
laws); id. § 9-109(d) (specifically exempting certain transactions from Article 9).
4. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2001).
5. See id. ("[Tihe right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire
possession of the goods is not a 'security interest."'). Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial
Code covers true leases, which are defined as "a transfer of the right to possession and use of
goods for a term in return for consideration." Id. § 2A-103(1)(j) (2003).
6. See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 275, 312
(2003) (noting that owning an asset allows the lessor to claim it as an asset on its balance sheet
and the lessee to expense the lease payments on its tax return).
7. See In re Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982); Aoki v. Shepherd
Machinery Co. (In re J. A. Thompson & Son, Inc.), 665 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1982); Cook Sales, Inc.
v. Shores (In re Shores), 332 B.R. 31 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re QDS Components, Inc., 292 B.R.
313 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002); In re Taylor, 209 B.R. 482 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1997); Sharer v. Crea-
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Gangloff Industries, Inc. v. Generic Financing & Leasing Corp.,
reveals a court once again wrestling with this issue. 8
In Gangloff Industries, the lessor, Generic Financing, entered into
an agreement with Robert Bougher for a three-year lease of a truck in
September 2005. 9 Bougher's wife, Kathy, in turn entered into a con-
tract with Gangloff Industries under which the Boughers were to haul
goods for Gangloff using the leased truck.'0 The second contract
specified that the Boughers were to pay for all repairs to the truck.'1
Through an unfortunate series of events, the truck broke down, Gan-
gloff paid for the repairs with the understanding that the Boughers
would repay it, and Robert Bougher suffered a fatal heart attack while
refueling the truck at a truck stop in July 2007.12 Gangloff took pos-
session of the truck and held it in storage, pending Kathy Bougher's
payment of the repair and storage costs. 13
In August 2007, the lessor Generic filed an action in Indiana state
court to recover the truck from Gangloff, asserting that Generic was
the true owner of the truck and that Gangloff was unlawfully holding
the truck for debts owed by the Boughers to it. 14 Generic sought
treble damages and attorneys' fees for conversion as well as recovery
of the truck. Gangloff then counterclaimed, alleging a possessory re-
pairman's lien on the truck and also a claim for quantum meruit.
Finding that the lessor Generic was likely to prevail at trial, the lower
court ordered Gangloff to give immediate possession of the truck to
Generic. After trial, the court found in favor of Generic and awarded
it $13,651 in damages and attorneys' fees.' 5 Gangloff appealed, and
the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling.16
The Indiana appellate court first addressed the issue of whether the
transaction between Generic and Robert Bougher was a true lease
governed by U.C.C. Article 2A or a disguised secured transaction gov-
erned by Article 9.17 The court noted that under the definition of se-
curity interest in Article 1, this inquiry is a fact-bound
tive Leasing, 612 So. 2d 1191 (Ala. 1993); Coleman v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. of N. Am., LLC,
623 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); U C Leasing, Inc. v. Laughlin, 606 P.2d 167 (Nev. 1980);
FMA Fin. Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).
8. 907 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
9. Id. at 1060-61.
10. Id. at 1061-62.
11. Id. at 1061.
12. Id. at 1062.
13. Gangloff Industries, 907 N.E.2d at 1062.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1062-63.
16. Id. at 1067.
17. Id. at 1063-64.
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determination.18 Certain arrangements, however, are always classi-
fied as secured transactions even if the parties choose to call them
leases:
A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the
consideration that the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to pos-
session and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the
lease and is not subject to termination by the lessee, and:
(1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods;
(2) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining eco-
nomic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the
goods;
(3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or
for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement; or
(4) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for
no additional consideration or for nominal additional consider-
ation upon compliance with the lease agreement. 19
In all four presumptive categories, the lessee must have an obligation
to pay rent for the lease term that "is not subject to termination by the
lessee. ' 20 This non-termination element requires that the lessee is
bound to the lease for the entire lease term and cannot escape the
obligation to make rental payments. In contrast, if the lessee can ter-
minate the lease at will, it is not assuming the same type of unalterable
financial obligation typically found in a secured transaction. 21
The first presumptive category under U.C.C. section 1-203(b) com-
prises transactions in which the lease term swallows up the economic
life of the leased goods.22 For example, if a piece of equipment has a
18. Gangloff Industries, 907 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing Indiana's version of former U.C.C. § 1-
201(37) ("Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or security interest is
determined by the facts of each case.")). Former U.C.C. § 1-201(37) is substantively the same as
new U.C.C. § 1-203(a). New Article 1 was first promulgated by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws in 2001 and has now been
adopted, in whole or in part, by all but a handful of states. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-fact
sheets/uniformacts-fs-uccl.asp (last visited July 27, 2010).
19. U.C.C. § 1-203(b) (2001); Gangloff Industries, 907 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing an earlier version
of Article 1 (U.C.C. § 1-201(37)) that is substantively the same as U.C.C. § 1-203(b) (2001)).
20. U.C.C. § 1-203(b) (2001).
21. See Crumley v. Berry, 766 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Ark. 1989) (finding that a transaction was a true
lease because the lessee could terminate it at any time).
22. See Wheels, Inc. v. Otasco, Inc. (In re Otasco, Inc.), 196 B.R. 554, 559 (N.D. Okla. 1991)
(holding that the first presumptive category did not apply where the lease was for 12 months and
the leased goods had a useful life of 50 months); In re Grubbs Constr. Co., 319 B.R. 698, 714
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (stating that one of the hallmarks of a true lease is that the goods have
some meaningful residual value at the end of the lease term); In re QDS Components, Inc., 292
[Vol. 9:169
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useful life of five years and the lease term is five years, the lessor most
likely is requiring the lessee to pay the equivalent of the fair market
value (plus interest) of the equipment. The hallmark of a true lease is
that there is something of value to give back to the lessor at the end of
the lease term.23 In this example, such is not the case. Under the
second presumptive category, the lessee is contractually bound to
keep renewing the lease for the useful life of the goods or to become
the owner of the goods.24 Once again, the parties are contemplating
that the lease term will parallel the useful life of the goods or that the
lessee will end up owning the goods. These transactions are in reality
disguised sales with the lessor's retention of "title" to the goods during
the lease term serving as a security interest.
The essence of the third and fourth presumptive categories is that
the lessee is under an economic compulsion to exercise the purchase
option at the end of the lease. 25 In other words, no sensible lessee
would fail to exercise the purchase option because it is so attractive.2 6
If the lessee can purchase a machine with a fair market value at the
end of the lease term of $5,000 for $1 or even $500, the lessee will
always exercise the option to buy.27 Even if the lessee has no further
use for the machine in its business, it can probably sell the item to
someone else for more than the option price or even dispose of the
item to a scrap dealer for more than the option price. Because the
economic compulsion to buy is always present in these situations, the
transactions are once again disguised sales with the lessor's reserving a
security interest ("title") in the goods during the lease term. To assist
courts in determining whether an option price is nominal, the drafters
include definitions and examples of "nominal" and "non-nominal"
B.R. 313, 331 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that the touchstone of a true lease is that "the
lessor retains an economically meaningful residual interest in the leased property").
23. In re QDS Components, Inc., 292 B.R. at 331; In re Double G Trucking of the Arklatex,
Inc., 432 B.R. 789, 800 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010).
24. U.C.C. § 1-203(b)(2) (2001). See, e.g., Key Equip. Fin. Inc. v. Zip, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-944,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38700, at * 9 (N.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007) (finding that the lease was proba-
bly a secured transaction where the lessee was required to purchase the leased goods at the end
of the lease term).
25. U.C.C. § 1-203(b)(3), (4) (2001).
26. See In re Buehne Farms, Inc., 321 B.R. 239, 245-46 (Bankr. S.D. I1. 2005) (discussing
economic realities test for true leases and noting that an option price is nominal if "only a fool
would fail to exercise the option").
27. See, e.g., In re Southeastern Materials, Inc., 433 B.R. 177, 181 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010)
(holding that lease was a disguised secured transaction where the lease had the option to
purchase the leased goods for $1 at the end of the lease term).
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consideration.28 In applying the statutory standards to the transaction
between Generic and Bougher, the Indiana Court of Appeals ob-
served that the lessee Bougher was obligated to pay Generic a total of
$43,052 over thirty-eight months.29 At the end of the lease term,
Bougher had the option to purchase the leased truck for $3,190, which
was approximately 7.5 percent of the total payments made. The court
held that that amount was nominal and that the agreement created a
security interest, not a lease. 30
Once having found that the Generic-Bougher arrangement was a
secured transaction, the court then ruled that Gangloff held a posses-
sory repairman's lien that was superior to Generic's security interest.31
Article 9 provides that possessory statutory liens, such as a repair-
man's lien, have priority over all security interests, perfected or un-
perfected, unless the statute creating the lien provides otherwise.32 In
this case, the Indiana statute creating the repairman's lien was silent
as to priority. 33 Consequently, the repair company, Gangloff, had pri-
ority over the secured party, Generic. 34
The Indiana appellate court's decision in this case is most likely cor-
rect, but two points are worth noting. First, in sorting out the lease-
secured transaction issue, the court determined that the purchase op-
tion price was nominal based on its relationship to the total amount
paid by the lessee over the lease term.35 More properly, one should
examine the relationship between the option price and the anticipated
fair market value of the leased goods at the time the option is to be
exercised. 36 For example, if the lessee has paid $50,000 over the lease
term but the anticipated fair market value of the goods at the end of
28. See U.C.C. § 1-203(d) (2001) ("Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the
lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agreement if the option is not
exercised."); id. § 1-203(d)(1), (2) (giving examples of non-nominal consideration).
29. Gangloff Indus., Inc. v. Generic Fin. & Leasing Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009).
30. Id. at 1065-66.
31. Id. at 1066-67.
32. U.C.C. § 9-333.
33. Gangloff Industries, 907 N.E.2d at 1066.
34. Id. at 1066-67.
35. One court noted the error of this approach and stated that the courts must examine
whether "at the end of the lease the lessor will receive either return of the leased goods or the
reasonably predicted fair market value the goods will have at the time the option is to be per-
formed." Sankey v. ABCO Leasing, Inc. (In re Sankey), 307 B.R. 674, 682 (D. Alaska 2004). If
so, then the transaction is a true lease. Id.
36. See In re UNI Imaging Holdings, LLC, 423 B.R. 406, 417 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010)
(stressing that in determining nominality of the option price, the court should examine "the
expectations of the parties concerning the projected value of the equipment at the time they
entered into the agreement, rather than the actual value at the conclusion of the term.").
[Vol. 9:169
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the term is $2,000, an option price of $1,500 would arguably not be
nominal. The lessee might easily decide that there was no point in
paying $1,500 to own a machine worth little more than that.
In Gangloff Industries, however, the parties presented no evidence
as to the truck's actual or anticipated fair market value, and therefore
the court was unable to use that figure in assessing whether the option
price was nominal. The putative lessor, Generic, could have pre-
served the transaction as a lease if it had shown that the truck had a
projected fair market value close to the option price of $3,190 at the
end of the lease. Additionally, Generic would have had to show that
the truck was anticipated to have some remaining useful life at that
point37 and that the lessee's projected cost of continued performance
under the lease was less than the option price.38
The second noteworthy point in Gangloff Industries is that the
lease-versus-security interest issue arguably should have made no dif-
ference to the outcome of the case. If the Generic-Bougher transac-
tion were a secured transaction, as the court found, then the statutory
lienholder, Gangloff, would have had priority over the secured party,
Generic.39 But if in fact that transaction were a true lease, then argua-
bly the lessor Generic would still have been responsible for the repairs
as the truck's true owner. Gangloff, properly asserting a repairman's
lien on the truck, would be able to have the lien satisfied by the true
owner before relinquishing possession.40
By incorporating purchase options into lease agreements, lessors al-
ways run the risk that the option price will be found nominal and that
a court will hold that the agreement creates a security interest subject
to Article 9 filing requirements. To avoid later trouble, a lessor should
always file a precautionary financing statement listing itself as the se-
cured party and the lessee as the debtor. 41 In Gangloff Industries, fil-
ing a financing statement to perfect the security interest would not
have changed the outcome because of the special provisions governing
statutory liens. But, in most cases, filing a financing statement will
37. In re QDS Components, Inc., 292 B.R. 313, 340 n.17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002).
38. Id. For example, if the option price is $1,000 and it would cost the lessee $2,000 to remove
the leased goods from its premises and ship them back to the lessor, the lessee might well decide
to exercise the option to purchase.
39. U.C.C. § 9-333.
40. Even if the contract between the lessor and the lessee had provided that the lessee was
responsible for repairs to the leased goods, the repairman would still be able to retain possession
of the goods until someone paid for the repairs. To retrieve the goods, the lessor would have had
to pay the repairman and then pursue the lessee for the cost of repairs under the terms of the
contract.
41. See U.C.C. § 9-505 (allowing precautionary filings by lessors).
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protect the lessor/secured party from other secured parties, the trustee
in bankruptcy, and other claimants. When in doubt, file.
II. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
A. The Debtor's Name on Initial Financing Statements
Once it is determined that a transaction is indeed subject to Article
9, it is then necessary to explore whether the secured party has prop-
erly perfected its security interest.42 Without proper perfection of
their security interests, secured creditors will often lose priority over
competing claimants to the debtor's property43 and will see their se-
curity interests stripped away by the trustee in the event of the
debtor's bankruptcy. 44 Filing of a financing statement in the appropri-
ate public record is the most common method of perfection and is, in
fact, required by Article 9 unless one of the statutory exceptions ap-
plies.45 The key to perfection is getting the debtor's name right on the
financing statement, and that task can sometimes prove more difficult
than would first appear.46 In some cases, the urge to put additional
names by which the debtor may be known on the financing statement
should be resisted.
Article 9 requires only three pieces of information on a financing
statement: the debtor's name, the secured party's name (or the name
of its representative), and an indication of collateral.47 Financing
42. Perfection of a security interest consists of attachment of the interest and an act of perfec-
tion. U.C.C. § 9-308(a). Attachment involves three steps: the secured party gives value to the
debtor, the debtor has rights in the collateral, and, ordinarily, the debtor authenticates a security
agreement describing the collateral. Id. § 9-203(a), (b). Although perfection can be achieved in
a number of ways, depending upon the type of collateral, the secured party's filing of a financing
statement in the public record is the most common method of perfection. Id. § 9-310(a).
43. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (affording perfected security interests priority over unperfected
security interests); id. § 9-317(a)(2) (providing that lien creditors have priority over unfiled se-
curity interests); id. § 9-317(b) (giving certain buyers priority over unperfected security
interests).
44. Under the so-called "strong arm" clause of the federal Bankruptcy Code, the trustee in
bankruptcy has the power to avoid unperfected security interests. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006).
45. U.C.C. § 9-310(a).
46. For a review of the statutory and judicial approaches to the degree of exactitude required
in setting forth the debtor's name on a financing statement, see Margit Livingston, A Rose by
Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet (or Would It?): Filing and Searching in the Article 9
Public Records, 2007 BYU L. REV. 111 (2007).
47. U.C.C. § 9-502(a). In addition to the three basic pieces of information, however, the filing
officer must reject financing statements that do not also contain the parties' addresses, an indica-
tion as to whether the debtor is an individual or an organization, and if the debtor is an organiza-
tion, the debtor's jurisdiction, type, and organizational identification number (or a statement
that the debtor has none). Id. §§ 9-516(b)(4), (5); 9-520(a). The 2010 Amendments to Article 9
eliminate the filing office's ability to reject financing statements that do not contain the debtor's
jurisdiction, type, and organization identification number (or a statement that the debtor has
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statements are indexed according to the debtor's name,48 and search-
ing parties ordinarily search under the debtor's name. Consequently,
the debtor's name is the gateway to the filing system and the single
most significant bit of information on the financing statement. In in-
sisting on exact and minimal precision by the secured party in filling
out a financing statement, a recent bankruptcy court came to the
somewhat surprising conclusion that a financing statement containing
both the debtor's correct legal name and a putative trade name was
invalid.49
Revised Article 9, which went into effect in most jurisdictions on
July 1, 2001,50 adheres to the substantial compliance standard for mea-
suring financing statement adequacy that existed under former Article
9. Under this standard, financing statements "substantially satisfying"
Article 9 requirements are still effective even if they contain "minor
errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing
statement seriously misleading. ' 51 The revised statute still permits
small mistakes by the secured party, provided that the financing state-
ment gives adequate notice to third parties.52
Regarding the specific issue of the debtor's name, however, Revised
Article 9 takes a stronger stand than the old law.53 In an apparent
attempt to resolve any ambiguities in the old law, the revision states
that "a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name
of the debtor in accordance with Section 9-503(a) is seriously mislead-
ing."' 54 In other words, errors in the debtor's name are fatal to the
financing statement's effectiveness, whether the error is minor or not.
none). Id. § 9-516(b)(5) (amended 2010). This information was not considered to be of suffi-
cient utility to justify the cost and delay added to the filing process of requiring it.
48. See id. § 9-519(c) (requiring the filing office to index financing statements according to the
debtor's name).
49. Hastings State Bank v. EDM Corp. (In re EDM Corp.), No. BK08-40788-TLS, 2009
Bankr. LEXIS 202, at *10-11 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 10, 2009).
50. Only four states adopted a non-uniform effective date: Connecticut, Alabama, Florida,
and Mississippi. ALA. CODE § 7-9A-701 (2010) (making Revised Article 9 effective as of Jan. 1,
2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-702 (2010) (making Revised Article 9 effective as of Oct. 1,
2001); FLA. STAT. § 679.701 (2010) (making Revised Article 9 effective as of Jan. 1, 2002); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-9-701 (2010) (making Revised Article 9 effective as of Jan. 1, 2002).
51. U.C.C. § 9-506(a).
52. Providing that "[a] financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of this
part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the
financing statement seriously misleading," Revised Article 9 emphasizes that the grievousness of
any errors is to be judged by whether they render the financing statement as a whole seriously
misleading as opposed to whether the errors themselves in isolation might be regarded as mis-
leading. Id.
53. For a comparison of the old and new laws regarding the sufficiency of the financing state-
ment, see Livingston, supra note 46, at 118-26.
54. U.C.C. § 9-506(b).
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All debtor name mistakes presumptively render the financing state-
ment seriously misleading. 55 This change in the law reinforces the
pre-revision notion that the debtor's name is the essence of the financ-
ing statement.
But, despite this new emphasis on complete accuracy, the revisers
recognized that secured parties may be excused some mistakes. Re-
vised Article 9 provides a safe harbor that saves financing statements
with errors in the debtor's name. If "a search of the records of the
filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's
standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that
fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor... the name pro-
vided does not make the financing statement seriously misleading. '56
This provision might be denominated the "single search standard" in
contrast to the pre-revision "reasonably diligent searcher standard. '57
Thus, under the new law, a third party must only search once for fi-
nancing statements for any particular debtor. This "single search"
should consist of entering the debtor's "correct" name into the filing
office's database and observing whether that search produces any re-
corded financing statements.58 If it does, then searchers must presum-
ably take the further step of determining whether the financing
statements found pertain to the person or entity with which they are
dealing. If the search does not produce any matches, then under the
"single search" standard, the searcher has completed its searching and
55. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-12 (5th
ed. 2000) (stating that "if the standard search logic.., fails to find a financing statement because
the name is incorrect, that renders the financing statement not only non-compliant with 9-502
and 9-503, but also means that it fails 'substantially' to satisfy the 'requirements of this Part'
under 9-506 and so is 'seriously misleading."').
56. U.C.C. § 9-506(c).
57. Under the pre-revision standard, courts examined whether or not a reasonably diligent
searcher employing accepted search techniques would likely find the financing statement with
the incorrect debtor name. See Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re
Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430, 1434-35 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Bosson, 432 F. Supp.
1013, 1017 (D. Conn. 1977) (citing JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 839 (1972)); TMMB Funding Corp. v. Associ-
ated Food Stores, Inc., 523 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App. Div. 1988) (citing JAMES J. WHITE & ROB-
ERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-16, at 957-58 (2d ed. 1980)).
58. See, e.g., Myers v. Am. Exch. Bank (In re Alvo Grain & Feed, Inc.), No. BK08-80876-TLS,
2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4259, at *8-9 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 20, 2009); Miller v. Van Dorn Demag
Corp. (In re Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.), 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1091, at *25 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 2005); Receivables Purchasing Co., Inc. v. R & R Directional Drilling, Inc., 588 S.E.2d
831, 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
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may assume that there are no filed financing statements recorded
against that particular person or entity.59
Revised Article 9 also elaborates on the question of what consti-
tutes the debtor's "name" for filing and searching purposes. For regis-
tered organizations, such as corporations and limited partnerships, a
financing statement "sufficiently" sets forth the debtor's name "only if
the financing statement provides the name of the debtor indicated on
the public record of the debtor's jurisdiction of organization which
shows the debtor to have been organized. ' 60 The revised statute also
sets forth the appropriate name to use for estates and trusts.61 Finally,
in the catchall provision for "all other cases," the new law requires
that the secured party set forth the individual or organizational name
of the debtor, if the debtor in fact has a name.62 If the debtor does not
have a name, then the secured party should list the names of the
"partners, members, associates, or other persons comprising the
debtor. " 63
In Hastings State Bank v. EDM Corp. (In re EDM Corp.), the se-
cured party Hastings State Bank had filed a financing statement listing
the debtor as "EDM CORPORATION d/b/a EDM EQUIPMENT. '64
The debtor's correct legal name was "EDM Corporation. ' 65 A later
secured party, Huntington National Bank, filed a financing statement
against the debtor setting forth its correct legal name.66 Before filing,
Huntington searched the Nebraska Secretary of State's records using
the debtor's legal name and did not find Hastings's financing
statement. 67
In the debtor's ensuing bankruptcy, Huntington argued that Has-
tings's financing statement was invalid because it was not revealed in a
"single search" using the debtor's correct legal name.68 Hastings,
however, asserted that its financing statement did comply with Article
9 because it contained the debtor's legal name, EDM Corporation. 69
59. See, e.g., First Cmty. Bank of E. Tenn. v. Jones (In re Silver Dollar, LLC), No. 06-50568,
2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3270, at *7-9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2008); In re John's Bean Farm of
Homestead, Inc., 378 B.R. 385, 390 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
60. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) (2001).
61. Id. § 9-503(a)(2), (3).
62. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(A).
63. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(B).
64. Hastings State Bank v. EDM Corp. (In re EDM Corp.), No. BK08-40788-TLS, 2009
Bankr. LEXIS 202, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 10, 2009).
65. Id. at *5.
66. Id. at *3.
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id. at *8-9.
69. Hastings State Bank, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 202, at *8.
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Furthermore, one of the Official Comments to Article. 9 specifically
allows creditors to add a debtor's trade names to the financing
statement.7
0
The bankruptcy court noted that the reasonably diligent searcher
standard under old Article 9 has been replaced by the "single search"
standard of U.C.C. section 9-506(c). 71 The court observed that a
search of the Nebraska Secretary of State's records using the debtor's
legal name, EDM Corporation, did not reveal Hastings's financing
statement listing the debtor as "EDM Corporation d/b/a EDM Equip-
ment. '72 Under the "single search" standard, therefore, Hastings's fi-
nancing statement was invalid.73 In addition, the court remarked that
the additional name, "EDM Equipment," did not appear to be a regis-
tered trade name or even necessarily a name commonly used by the
debtor. 74 Thus, the later secured party, Huntington, was entitled to
priority over Hastings.75 The court itself commented on the seeming
strangeness of this decision:
Hastings acted in a manner that many would consider prudent-it
included on its financing statement the debtor's true legal name as
well as another name by which the debtor was apparently known.
Hastings tried to cover all its bases. Frankly, it is hard to under-
stand why the Secretary of State search engine fails to find that fi-
nancing statement.76
One point, however, that the court arguably missed is that the "single
search" standard of U.C.C. section 9-506(c) applies only if section 9-
506(b) is not satisfied-in other words, only if the secured party's fi-
nancing statement "fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor
in accordance with Section 9-503(a). ' 77 In this case, Hastings did
70. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2).
71. Id. at *9-10 (citing Genoa Nat'l Bank v. Southwest Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353
B.R. 886, 888-89 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2006)); see also U.C.C. § 9-506(c).
72. Hastings State Bank, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 202, at *9.
73. Id. at *10.
74. Id. at *8.
75. Id. at *16-17.
76. Id. at *10. Another bankruptcy court expressed similar frustration at the rigidity of the
official search logic where the filing system distinguished between "and" and "&" rather than
treating them interchangeably:
I feel it is important to note that while I am compelled to make that decision, it is not at
all an easy one to make. The evidence showed that over many years Debtor used the
"and" and the "&" interchangeably. Clearly, Debtor considered it to be a distinction
without significance. Frankly, it is hard to understand why the Secretary of State's
search logic failed to recognize the "&" symbol as the equivalent of "and" since "&"
literally means "and."
Myers v. Am. Exch. Bank (In re Alvo Grain & Feed, Inc.), No. BK08-80876-TLS, 2009 Bankr.
LEXIS 4259, at *9 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 20, 2009).
77. U.C.C. § 9-506(c).
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place the debtor's correct legal name, EDM Corporation, on its fi-
nancing statement although it went on to add a trade name.78 Seem-
ingly, then, Hastings complied with the Code sections requiring the
debtor's name on a financing statement 79 and defining an organiza-
tional debtor's name as its officially registered name.80 As a conse-
quence, Hastings arguably did not violate the Code provision
rendering financing statements invalid if they fail to provide the
debtor's correct name.'
Ultimately, the court apparently felt trapped by U.C.C. section 9-
506(c) and the "single search" standard. The subsequent secured
party, Huntington, was not able to find the Hastings financing state-
ment in conducting a search of the official database using the debtor's
legal name.82 The manner in which Hastings set forth the debtor's
name-i.e., the legal name followed by a putative trade name-
caused the official database's search engine to pass over the Hastings
financing statement. The flaw, it would seem, lies with the Nebraska
Secretary of State and the rigidity of its search algorithm. 83
The holding in Hastings State Bank continues the judicial trend in
favor of extreme exactitude in setting forth the debtor's name and the
almost mechanical application of the "single search" standard. Article
9 requires only the debtor's correct name on the financing statement,
which for registered organizations means "the name of the debtor in-
dicated on the public record of the debtor's jurisdiction of organiza-
tion which shows the debtor to have been organized. ' 84 Thus, to be
78. Hastings State Bank, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 202, at *3.
79. U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (2001).
80. Id. § 9-503(a)(1).
81. Id. § 9-506(b).
82. Hastings State Bank, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 202, at *7.
83. In another case involving an unforgiving search logic, the secured party had listed the
debtor's name as "Tyringham Holdings" on the financing statement. Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors for Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna Bros., Inc. (In re Tyringham Holdings,
Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 364 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006). The debtor's legal name was Tyringham Hold-
ings, Inc. Id. Ordinarily, a search under the debtor's legal name in a typical computerized filing
system would have revealed the secured party's financing statement because "Inc." is treated as
a noise word and is ignored by both the filing and searching mechanism. Id. at 366. In this case,
however, the Virginia filing office's search logic did not treat "Inc." as a noise word, and the
secured party's financing statement was not found in a "single search." Id. at 368. The court
found the filing insufficient. Id. Similarly, in another bankruptcy case, the court found the se-
cured party's financing statement insufficient where the debtor's correct legal name was Alvo
Grain and Feed, Inc., and the name on the financing statement was "Alvo Grain & Feed, Inc."
Myers v. Am. Exch. Bank (In re Alvo Grain & Feed, Inc.), No. BK08-80876-TLS, 2009 Bankr.
LEXIS 4259, at *8-9 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 20, 2009). The standard search logic of the Nebraska
filing system distinguished between "and" and "&," and thus the use of "&" in the debtor's
name on the financing statement constituted a fatal error.
84. U.C.C. §§ 9-502(a)(1), 9-503(a)(1) (2001).
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completely safe and to avoid the somewhat odd result in Hastings
State Bank, a secured creditor should ascertain the debtor's legal
name and put that name alone on the financing statement. If a credi-
tor feels disposed to add the debtor's trade names8 5 it should then run
a test search in the official public database under the debtor's legal
name to determine whether the financing statement is disclosed.86 If
it is not, the creditor should refile using only the debtor's correct legal
name.
The 2010 Amendments to Article 9 pursue the seemingly elusive
goal of providing bright line rules regarding the debtor's name on the
financing statement. One of the amendments, in particular, narrows
the possible choice for setting forth the name of a debtor who is an
individual. As mentioned previously, before the 2010 Amendments,
Article 9 stated that a financing statement "sufficiently provides the
name of the debtor.., if the debtor has a name, only if it provides the
individual or organizational name of the debtor. ' 87 The 2010 Amend-
ments offer two alternative provisions applying to individual debtor
names. Under Alternative A, the secured party is directed to use the
name of an individual debtor as indicated on his/her unexpired
driver's license issued by "this State. '88 If the debtor does not have an
unexpired driver's license issued by "this State," then the secured
party should provide the "individual name of the debtor or the sur-
name and first personal name of the debtor." 89
Under Alternative B, the secured party may choose among the
driver's license name, individual name, or surname/first name options.
A financing statement will be sufficient if the secured party uses either
(A) the debtor's individual name; (B) the debtor's surname and first
personal name; or (C) the debtor's name as indicated on an unexpired
driver's license issued by the state of the debtor's principal resi-
dence. 90 This alternative gives the filing creditor more flexibility: The
secured party may appropriately use any of those three names on the
financing statement. Obviously, employing the name on an unexpired
driver's license from the debtor's home state may be the easiest way
to comply with the statute-the creditor does not have to go through
other papers offered by the debtor, such as a birth certificate, income
tax return, or social security card, and possibly have to reconcile in-
85. See id. § 9-503(b)(1) (not requiring trade names on financing statements).
86. See id. § 9-523(c) (requiring the filing office to respond to requests for information about
financing statements on file).
87. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A) (2001).
88. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) Alt. A (amended 2010).
89. Id. § 9-503(a)(5).
90. Id. § 9-503(a)(4) Alt. B.
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consistent names on them. In cases where the debtor does not have a
current driver's license from his/her home state, the creditor will find
itself with the same options offered by Alternative A-the debtor's
individual name or his/her surname and first personal name.
In addition, the amended provisions change debtor name require-
ments for registered organizations to pinpoint a single name for a cor-
poration, limited liability company, limited partnership, or other
registered organization.91 The pre-amendment version of Article 9 di-
rected secured parties to use the name of a registered organization
debtor as "indicated on the public record of the debtor's jurisdiction
of organization which shows the debtor to have been organized. '92
The 2010 Amendments change this language so as to require creditors
to file against a registered organization using the name "that is stated
to be the registered organization's name on the public organic record
most recently filed with or issued or enacted by the registered organi-
zation's jurisdiction of organization which purports to state, amend, or
restate the registered organization's name. '93 "Public organic record"
is basically a new concept that refers to the organization's "birth cer-
tificate"-i.e., the actual record initially filed with the state or federal
government to form the organization or to amend or restate the initial
record.94
These proposed changes, one can hope, will reduce the apparently
never ending stream of cases litigating the sufficiency of the debtor's
name on a financing statement. By attempting to specify and narrow
the range of choices for filers and searchers, the amendments provide
safe harbors for filing creditors in picking a debtor name for the fi-
nancing statement while maintaining a very limited number of search-
ing options for the party seeking accurate information from the public
filing system.
B. Seriously Misleading Debtor Name Changes
Even if the original filing secured creditor gets the debtor's name
completely accurate on its financing statement, a change in the
debtor's name can render the financing statement seriously misleading
91. The amendments also set forth changes to debtor name requirements for estates and
trusts. See id. § 9-503(a)(2), (3) (amended 2010).
92. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) (2001).
93. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) (amended 2010). The definition of "registered organization" is also
amended to clarify that a registered organization is an organization formed or organized under
state or federal law "by the filing of a public organic record with, the issuance of a public organic
record by, or the enactment of legislation by the State or United States." Id. § 9-102(a)(71).
94. Id. § 9-102(a)(68).
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and almost impossible to find by later searchers.95 In dealing with
debtor name changes, Article 9 attempts to balance filers' interests in
not having to monitor the debtor too closely and searchers' interests
in having an accurate database to search. Thus, the Code drafters cre-
ated a four-month rule with respect to seriously misleading changes in
the debtor's name.96 A recent bankruptcy decision, Gugino v. Wells
Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. (In re Lifestyle Home Furnishings,
LLC), 97 interpreted the four-month rule where the debtor breached
its contractual obligation to inform the secured creditor in advance of
changes in its name.
In Gugino, the Bank made a loan to the debtor, Factory Direct,
LLC, and took a security interest in the debtor's inventory, accounts,
equipment, and general intangibles. In November 2003, the Bank
filed a financing statement in the appropriate public office, listing the
debtor's correct name.98 In early 2007, two individuals purchased the
debtor and received additional loans from the Bank. On May 7, 2007,
the debtor officially changed its organizational name from "Factory
Direct, LLC" to "Lifestyle Home Furnishings, LLC."99 The Bank did
not file a new financing statement or amend the existing one to reflect
the name change. 100 On April 7, 2008, Lifestyle filed a Chapter 7 peti-
tion in bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the
Bank's unperfected security interest under the strong-arm clause of
the federal Bankruptcy Code. 10 1
The bankruptcy court in Gugino noted that Article 9 provides a
four-month rule for debtor name changes:
If a debtor so changes its name that a filed financing statement be-
comes seriously misleading ... (1) [t]he financing statement is effec-
tive to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor
before, or within four (4) months after, the change; and (2) [t]he
financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four (4) months after
the change, unless an amendment to the financing statement which
renders the financing statement not seriously misleading is filed
within four (4) months after the change. 102
95. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors Propex Inc. v. BNP Paribas (In re Propex
Inc.), 415 B.R. 321, 332 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009); Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Say.
Bank, 244 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. 1976); Harry C. Sigman, The Filing System Under Revised
Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61, 80 (1999).
96. U.C.C. § 9-507(c).
97. No. 08-00629-TLM, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 111 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 14, 2010).
98. Id. at *34.
99. Id. at *4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *5 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006)).
102. Gugino, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 111, at *7-8 (citing Idaho's version of U.C.C. § 9-507(c)).
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In determining whether a debtor name change renders the filed fi-
nancing statement "seriously misleading," the court looked to the
"single search" standard under section 9-506(c) and the basic debtor
name provisions of section 9-503.103 The court observed that for a
registered organization such as this debtor, the financing statement
must contain "the name of the debtor indicated on the public record
of the debtor's jurisdiction of organization which shows the debtor to
have been organized."' 10 4 The court then concluded that the change in
the debtor's name from "Factory Direct, LLC" to "Lifestyle Home
Furnishings, LLC" rendered the Bank's original filed financing state-
ment seriously misleading. 10 5 The Bank basically conceded that a
search under the debtor's new name would not have disclosed the
Bank's filing under the old name.'0 6
In applying the four-month grace period to the facts before it, the
court in Gugino stated that the Bank's security interest lost its perfec-
tion only in collateral acquired more than four months after the
debtor's name change. 0 7 The Code drafters deliberately crafted the
rule to avoid loss of perfection in older collateral-i.e., collateral ac-
quired by the debtor before the name change and within four months
thereafter. The rule's rationale is apparently to protect secured par-
ties with static collateral, such as equipment financers, and to require
monitoring by secured parties with changing collateral, such as ac-
counts and inventory financers. 0 8 Because debtors only occasionally
replace old equipment, the equipment secured party can be assured
that its financing statement will remain effective for most of its collat-
eral-most, if not all, of the debtor's equipment will have been ac-
quired before the name change when the parties originally entered
into their secured transaction. Inventory and accounts financers, on
the other hand, must remain alert to possible debtor name changes
because their collateral constantly turns over:10 9 old inventory is sold
103. Id. at *8-9. The 2010 Amendments to Article 9 change section 9-507(c) to clarify that the
predicate for a meaningful debtor name change is that "the name that a filed financing statement
provides for a debtor becomes insufficient as the name of the debtor under Section 9-503(a)."
U.C.C. § 9-507(c) (amended 2010).
104. Gugino, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 111, at *8 (citing Idaho's version of U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1)).
105. Id. at *11.
106. Id. at *10-11 n.6.
107. Id. at *11-12 n.7.
108. See LYNN M. LoPuCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMs AP-
PROACH 393 (6th ed. 2009) (noting the difference in the four-month rule's application to equip-
ment vs. inventory financers).
109. Russell A. Hakes, According Purchase Money Status Proper Priority, 72 OR. L. REv. 323,
388 (1993); Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money Inventory Financing: The Case for Limited
Cross-Collateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1289 (1990).
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and replaced with new items, and old accounts are paid by customers
and new accounts are created over the course of time.
In the drafters' view, inventory and accounts secured creditors have
to monitor their debtors closely anyway to ensure that the debtor is
maintaining proper levels of collateral."" To ask them to take on the
additional responsibility of tracking debtor name changes is not im-
posing a significant burden on them. Equipment secured parties, on
the other hand, tend to be more passive and to not interact with their
debtors unless the debtors' payments stop coming. Thus, asking
equipment financers to assume the responsibility to keep abreast of
debtor name changes would place a substantial burden on them.
In Gugino, the Bank had taken a security interest in both types of
collateral-equipment and inventory/accounts.111 The court acknowl-
edged that it would have to determine at trial which collateral had
been acquired more than four months after the name change-i.e., on
or after September 8, 2007.112 Given the bankruptcy filing on April 7,
2008, it is likely that much of the debtor's inventory and accounts
would have turned over after September 8, 2007. In that event, the
Bank would have lost perfection of its security interest in a large por-
tion of its collateral and have its unperfected security interest subject
to avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee.
In a final, last-ditch effort to save its perfection, the Bank argued
that the court should impose a constructive trust on the collateral in
favor of the Bank.113 A constructive trust is an equitable remedy im-
posed in favor of the victim of fraud, duress, or other inequitable con-
duct. 114 The trust provides that a wrongdoer holds property for the
benefit of the victim. 1 15 Once subject to a constructive trust, the prop-
erty is immune to the claims of other creditors of the wrongdoer. 1 6
The Bank in Gugino asserted that the debtor had breached its con-
110. See, e.g., Transamerica Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton) 942 F.2d 551, 552-
53 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing inventory monitoring arrangement); United States v. Steffen, No.
4:10CR371JCH(MLM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119278, at *15 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2010) (describ-
ing inventory monitoring arrangement).
111. Gugino, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 111, at *34.
112. Id. at *11-12 n.7.
113. Id. at *13-14.
114. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 597-98 (2d ed. 1993) (listing embezzlement,
fraud, duress, undue influence, and misuse to position or information as bases for the imposition
of a constructive trust).
115. Id. at 595 (noting that in a constructive trust "the defendant has legal title and must
therefore be treated as a 'trustee' who holds that title for the plaintiff.").
116. Id. at 594. The theoretical justification for giving the plaintiff who has been awarded a
constructive trust over property in the defendant's possession priority over the defendant's other
creditors is that the property in question was never really the defendant's; it was in fact being
held in trust for the plaintiff. Id.
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tractual obligation to inform the Bank of any debtor name changes. 1 17
In addition, after changing its registered name, the debtor had contin-
ued to do business under its old name, thus creating the impression
that the old name was still its official legal name.118 The court de-
clined to rule on the constructive trust issue and stated that certain
factual issues needed to be resolved at trial before a final determina-
tion could be made.119 The court noted, however, that bankruptcy
courts are reluctant to use constructive trusts to save secured parties
from loss of perfection as such remedies tend to upset the carefully
crafted bankruptcy distribution scheme. 120
Dealing with debtor name changes can be a tricky problem for se-
cured parties. The Bank in Gugino had the right idea in insisting on a
contractual provision requiring the debtor to inform it in advance of
any name changes. 121 Breach of that provision was undoubtedly a de-
fault under the loan agreement and gave the creditor the power to
accelerate the loan balance. Notwithstanding the incentives to be-
have, sometimes debtors run amok, drastically changing their names
and not telling the secured party. The secured party should try to
have in place certain monitoring systems, under which the creditor
keeps track of the name that the debtor is using on its checks to the
secured party, on its letterhead, and in its advertising. In addition, the
secured party should run a routine check every four months in the
state's corporate registry, which should reveal whether or not the
debtor has changed its legal name. If a name change has occurred, the
secured party should immediately refile using the new name. Finally,
if the creditor does not learn of the name change despite its best ef-
forts and the debtor goes into bankruptcy, it can always argue the eq-
uities in its favor and beg the court for a constructive trust.
C. Collateral Descriptions on Financing Statements
Filling out the financing statement should be a relatively straightfor-
ward task for the secured creditor. Getting the debtor's name set
forth correctly and updating the record after substantial debtor name
changes, however, can prove a challenging matter, as discussed above.
117. Gugino, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 111, at *13.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *16.
120. Id. at *14-15. Compare In re North American Coin & Currency, Ltd., 767 F.2d 1573,
1575 (9th Cir. 1985) (cautioning against the use of constructive trusts in bankruptcy) with Sanyo
Electric, Inc. v. Howard's Appliance Corp. (In re Howard's Appliance Corp.), 874 F.2d 88, 94
(2d Cir. 1989) (allowing a constructive trust in bankruptcy where the debtor had failed to inform
the secured party that it had moved the collateral to another state).
121. Gugino, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 111, at *13.
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Further, adequately describing the collateral on the financing state-
ment can apparently also elude the secured party. 122 Collateral de-
scriptions on financing statements pose particular concerns for
secured parties because the debtor must authorize the filing against
specified collateral. 123 In a recent decision, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling and held that the se-
cured party's indication of collateral, although containing some errors
and at least partially unauthorized, was legally sufficient.' 24 The court
emphasized the very general notice-giving function of the financing
statement and the need for subsequent parties to inquire further
about the exact nature of the security interest indicated in the financ-
ing statement.
In ProGrowth Bank, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the plaintiff
secured party, ProGrowth Bank, sought a declaratory judgment
against an earlier secured party, Global One Financial, Inc., and its
agent, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., to the effect that the plaintiff's security
interest in the debtor's annuity contracts had priority over the defend-
ants' security interests. 2 5 Global had filed a financing statement
through its agent, Wells Fargo, on September 8, 2005, listing the
debtor as "Christopher J. Hanson" and the collateral as "[a]ll of
Debtor's right, title, and interest in and to, assets and rights of Debtor,
wherever located and whether now owned or hereafter acquired or
arising, and all proceeds and products in that certain Annuity Con-
tract No.: LE900015 issued by Lincoln Benefit Life in the name of
Debtor .... 126 The number and issuer for the annuity contract speci-
fied by the security agreement were incorrect on the financing state-
ment. The actual number of the annuity contract was "L9E00015,"
and the actual issuer was Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance
Company. 127
122. As mentioned previously, an effective financing statement need contain only three pieces
of information: the debtor's name, the secured party's name (or the name of its representative),
and an indication of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-502(a). Article 9 gives secured parties two dis-
tinct ways to indicate the collateral: they can either describe the collateral in accordance with
section 9-108 or use a supergeneric description such as "all assets" or "all personal property."
Id. § 9-504. A description of collateral under section 9-108 is sufficient if "it reasonably identi-
fies what is described." Id. § 9-108(a).
123. The secured party must obtain authorization to file a financing statement from the
debtor, either in the security agreement or in a separate document authenticated by the debtor.
U.C.C. § 9-509(a), (b). If the secured party is relying on the security agreement to provide au-
thorization, the financing statement collateral description must track that on the security agree-
ment. Id. § 9-509(b)(1).
124. ProGrowth Bank, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 558 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 811.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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On September 16, 2005, Global filed a second financing statement
through its agent listing the same debtor and containing an almost
identical collateral description. 128 The only difference in the collateral
description was the number of the annuity contract: "L9E00016," the
correct number for a second annuity contract encumbered by the par-
ties' security agreement. 129 The annuity issuer, however, was still in-
correctly identified as "Lincoln Benefit Life" instead of "Fidelity &
Guaranty.' 30
In February 2006, the debtor obtained a loan from ProGrowth and
gave it a security interest in the same two annuity contracts. 131 On
February 14, 2006, ProGrowth filed two financing statements with the
Missouri Secretary of State accurately describing the collateral as "Fi-
delity and Guaranty Life Insurance Annuity Contracts Number
L9E00015 and Number L9E00016.' 32 A year later ProGrowth insti-
tuted a suit for declaratory judgment to the effect that its security in-
terests in the annuity contracts were superior to those of Global. 133
Specifically, ProGrowth argued that Global's financing statements
were seriously misleading by virtue of the collateral description errors
and that therefore Global's security interests in the annuity contracts
were unperfected.134 The district court granted the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment, and the defendants appealed.1 35
Before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the parties agreed that
the priority issue turned on whether the defendants had properly per-
fected their security interests in the debtor's annuity contracts. 136 The
Court of Appeals began by noting that an indication of collateral is
one of the three basic pieces of information that must be on a financ-
ing statement. 137 In fulfilling this requirement, secured parties may
provide a description of collateral that complies with U.C.C. section 9-
108 (providing a "reasonable identification" standard) or may list the
collateral more generally as "all assets" or "all personal property.' 38
In assessing the sufficiency of financing statements, courts are to apply
Article 9's "substantial compliance" standard, which states that "[a]
financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of this
128. Id.
129. ProGrowth Bank, 558 F.3d at 811.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ProGrowth Bank, 558 F.3d at 811-12.
135. Id. at 812.
136. Id.
137. See id. (citing Missouri's version of U.C.C. § 9-502(a)).
138. See id. (citing Missouri's version of U.C.C. § 9-504).
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part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the
errors or omissions make the financing statement seriously
misleading. 1 39
The plaintiff argued that under the substantial compliance standard,
the defendants' financing statements were seriously misleading be-
cause they misidentified the annuity issuer for both annuity contracts
and the annuity number for one of them.140 The court indicated that
if the annuity descriptions were the only collateral descriptions in the
financing statements, it would "be inclined to agree" with the plain-
tiff's argument. 141 The financing statements, however, also contained
a general "all assets" description of collateral, and this description, the
court held, was sufficient to include the annuity contracts. 142 The
plaintiff tried to rebut that position by arguing that the "all assets"
clause was modified by the subsequent specific language describing
the annuity contracts by issuer and number. 43 But the court stated
that "this interpretation ... is unduly restrictive and ignores the plain
language of the statements.' 44 The two clauses describing the collat-
eral, the court observed, were joined by an "and" and thus indepen-
dent of each other.145 As a result, the "all assets" description was not
narrowed by the subsequent language referring to the annuity
contracts. 4
6
The court also noted that even if the plaintiff's interpretation of the
financing statement language were reasonable, the defendants' inter-
pretation was reasonable as well. Consequently,
[w]here a description can reasonably be interpreted in one of two
ways-one of which may cover the collateral at issue and one of
which does not-notice filing has served its purpose of alerting sub-
sequent creditors to the possibility that a piece of collateral may be
covered; the burden is then on the subsequent creditor to inquire
further. 147
Further, although the specific description of the annuity contracts con-
tained seriously misleading errors, an inquiring creditor would be
alerted by the "all assets" clause to the possibility that the annuity
139. See ProGrowth Bank, 558 F.3d at 812 (citing Missouri's version of U.C.C. § 9-506(a)).
140. Id. at 813.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. ProGrowth Bank, 558 F.3d at 813-14.
145. Id. at 814.
146. Id.
147. Id.
[Vol. 9:169
BEWITCHED, BOTHERED AND BEWILDERED
contracts in question could be subject to a security interest in favor of
Global. 148
The lessons offered by this case are harsh for both debtors and sub-
sequent inquiring third parties. First, a secured party may file an "all
assets" financing statement seemingly without the debtor's authoriza-
tion and end up in the senior position. On remand, the district court
held that even if the "all assets" clause in the financing statement was
not authorized as required by Article 9, the portion of that clause cov-
ering the annuity contracts was authorized by virtue of the security
agreement signed by the debtor. 149 In other words, a secured party
can exceed the scope of the agreed upon language in the security
agreement by filing an "all assets" financing statement and not suffer
any consequences beyond possible liability for statutory and actual
damages. 150 Second, subsequent inquiring creditors must be on "high
alert" when they see an "all assets" financing statement even when the
financing statement describes specifically two annuity contracts in
which the subsequent creditor has no interest. In this case,
ProGrowth, the subsequent creditor, was interested in taking a secur-
ity interest in two specific annuity contracts owned by the debtor.
Upon conducting a search, ProGrowth would have seen Global's fi-
nancing statement covering "all assets" and two annuity contracts ap-
parently unrelated to the ones shown to ProGrowth by the debtor.
Given the human tendency to focus on the specific over the general, it
is quite likely that ProGrowth would have concluded that the two an-
nuity contracts in which it was interested were not covered by the fi-
nancing statement.
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit decision in ProGrowth Bank may
leave one slightly uncomfortable: the senior secured party botched its
description of the annuity contracts on the financing statement but
saved its perfection by adding an unauthorized "all assets" clause.
But despite the decision's counterintuitive quality, it embodies a cor-
rect reading of Article 9.151 The check on overreaching collateral de-
scriptions lies in Article 9's damages provisions. 152 In addition, the
debtor could demand that the secured party file an amendment to the
148. Id.
149. See ProGrowth Bank, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 07-1577, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83805, at *33-34 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2009) (citing Missouri's version of U.C.C. §§ 9-
509(a), 9-510(a)).
150. See U.C.C. § 9-625(b), (e) (providing for actual and statutory damages for filing of an
unauthorized financing statement).
151. See id. § 9-509 cmt. 1.
152. Id. § 9-625(b), (e).
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financing statement to remove the "all assets" portion in exchange for
giving up its damages suit against the creditor. 153
Attorneys setting up these types of transactions should make sure
that the collateral description on the financing statement matches that
on the security agreement and that both descriptions are accurate.
154
If the secured party wants to use a more general collateral description
on the financing statement (e.g., "annuity contracts") instead of the
precise description used on the security agreement, the creditor
should obtain separate authorization from the debtor to use the more
general language. Finally, searching parties who run across a financ-
ing statement with an "all assets" clause or similar supergeneric lan-
guage should investigate thoroughly the transaction behind that
financing statement. Given the senior secured party's ability under
Article 9 priority rules to have the priority of a subsequent security
agreement relate back to the time of the original filing, 155 the subse-
quent creditor should insist that the "all assets" clause be narrowed or
run the risk of being junior to the earlier creditor in whatever collat-
eral the subsequent party may take a security interest.
D. Perfection of Security Interests by Control: Deposit Accounts
Security interests in deposit accounts pose special problems under
Article 9. First, the normal mechanism for perfecting a security inter-
est-the filing of a financing statement in the public record-is not
used for secured transactions involving deposit accounts.' 56 Second,
the ordinary chronological rules for prioritizing competing secured
parties often do not apply either.157 Thus, a secured creditor seeking
to create, perfect, and enforce a security interest in its debtor's deposit
accounts must be mindful of the particular Article 9 provisions gov-
erning these types of transactions. A recent Nebraska Supreme Court
decision reveals that depository banks that take security interests in
their customers' accounts enjoy a favored status under Article 9-a
153. See id. § 9-512 (providing for amendments to financing statements, including deletions of
collateral). The debtor could also file a "correction statement" indicating that the financing
statement was wrongfully filed with respect to certain collateral listed. Id. § 9-518.
154. See id. § 9-509(b) (providing that the debtor's authentication of a security agreement
authorizes the secured party to file a financing statement using the same collateral description).
155. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1).
156. See id. § 9-312(b)(1) (specifying that security interests in deposit accounts may be per-
fected only by control with the exception of cash proceeds placed into a deposit account).
157. See id. § 9-327(1) (giving secured parties with control over deposit accounts priority over
secured parties that hold security interests in deposit accounts perfected through a proceeds
analysis) and § 9-327(2) (awarding first priority to the depository bank unless the secured party
has become the bank's customer with respect to the account).
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status that pushes other secured and lien creditors down the priority
ladder.158
Under Article 9, a deposit account is defined as "a demand, time,
savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank."'159
Hence, a traditional checking or savings account held at a bank would
qualify as an Article 9 deposit account. Because the term, however,
does not include "investment property or accounts evidenced by an
instrument," negotiable certificates of deposit or money market-type
accounts would seemingly not constitute a deposit account but would
fall into another category of collateral.' 60
Unlike the typical security interest, which is perfected by filing, de-
posit account security interests are perfected through a mechanism
called "control." Although one provision suggests that perfection by
control is permissive for deposit accounts, 16 1 in fact, security interests
in deposit accounts "may be perfected only by control," unless pro-
ceeds are involved. 162 A secured party may achieve control of a de-
posit account in one of three ways: (1) by becoming the depository
bank at which the account is maintained; (2) by entering into a tripar-
tite agreement with the debtor and the depository bank that gives the
secured party authority over the account; or (3) by becoming the
"bank's customer with respect to the deposit account."'1 63 Obviously,
for non-bank secured parties the first option is not available. The sec-
ond option requires that the debtor, the secured party, and the deposi-
tory bank authenticate a record specifying "that the bank will comply
with instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition
of the funds in the deposit account without further consent by the
debtor."' 64 Under the third option, the secured party would become a
named holder of the account, presumably jointly with the debtor. 165
A non-bank secured creditor choosing between the second and
third options should note that the third option is ordinarily going to be
the better choice for the creditor. As an account holder, the creditor
could presumably withdraw the funds necessary to satisfy the default-
ing debtor's obligation with or without the depository bank's active
158. See Myers v. Christensen, 776 N.W.2d 201 (Neb. 2009).
159. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 9-314(a).
162. Id. § 9-312(b)(1). Deposit accounts are considered to be cash proceeds, and security in-
terests in identifiable cash proceeds are afforded automatic continuation of perfection. Id. §§ 9-
102(a)(9); 9-315(c), (d)(2).
163. U.C.C. § 9-104(a).
164. Id. § 9-104(a)(2).
165. Id. § 9-104(a)(3).
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cooperation. 166 Under the second option, however, the bank might
require that the secured party satisfy certain conditions before it could
access funds in the debtor's account-for example, the creditor might
have to demonstrate that the debtor was truly in default before the
bank would transfer funds to the creditor.1 67
Apart from control, the only other way for a secured party to
achieve perfection of a security interest in a deposit account is through
a proceeds claim. For example, a secured party may have a security
interest in the debtor's inventory perfected by filing. If the debtor
sells some inventory to customers and receives cash payments, the
Code gives the secured party an automatic carryover interest in those
payments as proceeds as long as they are identifiable.1 68 In addition,
the security interest in cash proceeds is automatically perfected for
twenty days after the proceeds are generated and indefinitely beyond
that point.1 69 If the debtor deposits the payments into a bank account,
they retain their character as cash proceeds. 170
Given the frequent presence of both secured parties with direct se-
curity interests in their debtor's deposit accounts and those with a pro-
ceeds interest, it is perhaps inevitable that a priorities contest will
result. For security interests in deposit accounts, the normal chrono-
logical order of priority is sometimes followed. 171 For example, secur-
ity interests in deposit accounts perfected by control are generally
ranked according to "priority in time of obtaining control."'1 72 But
there are important exceptions to the chronological ranking. For ex-
ample, a security interest perfected by control always has priority over
a security interest perfected by means of the automatic perfection in
cash proceeds, regardless of the chronological order of the transac-
tions. 173 In addition, a security interest of a depository bank in a cus-
tomer's account will trump an earlier security interest in that account
where the secured party achieved control by means of a tripartite
166. See, e.g., Nail v. Duff, 805 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Ark. 1991) (holding that each joint tenant of
a bank account may withdraw the entire amount in the account without the other tenants' per-
mission); Mich. Dep't of Treasury v. Comerica Bank, 506 N.W.2d 283, 286-87 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that each joint tenant of a bank account may withdraw the entire amount in the
account without the other tenants' permission).
167. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 3.
168. Id. § 9-315(a)(2).
169. Id. § 9-315(c), (d)(2).
170. See id. § 9-102(a)(9) (defining cash proceeds as "money, checks, deposit accounts or the
like.").
171. See id. § 9-322(a)(1) (creating the first-to-file or perfect rule).
172. U.C.C. § 9-327(2).
173. Id. § 9-327(1).
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agreement with the bank and the debtor. 174 If, however, the non-bank
secured party attained control by becoming the bank's customer with
respect to the debtor's account, it will have priority over the deposi-
tory bank.175
The most favored status afforded depository banks holding security
interests in their customers' deposit accounts was reflected in the re-
cent Nebraska Supreme Court decision in Myers v. Christensen.176 In
Myers, the depository bank, Charter West, held a perfected security
interest in the debtor Gencon's deposit accounts with Charter West. 177
The trustee in bankruptcy of a judgment creditor of Gencon served a
garnishment summons on Charter West, seeking to enforce a judg-
ment of $10,450.178 At the time that Charter West received the sum-
mons, Gencon's deposit account contained $30,702, and Gencon was
in default to Charter West on loans exceeding $400,000.179 Charter
West did not seek to enforce its security interest in the deposit account
until after it was served with the garnishment summons.180
In the ensuing action by the trustee against Charter West, the trus-
tee argued that Charter West, once having received the garnishment
summons, was bound by Nebraska law to hold the funds in the
debtor's deposit account for the garnishor. 181 The lower court agreed
and held that Charter West was liable to the trustee in the full amount
of the $10,450 claim.1 82 Charter West appealed, and the Nebraska Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court's judgment.183 The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the lower court had failed to give proper
effect to Charter West's status as a perfected Article 9 secured
party.1 84 Unquestionably, perfected security interests have priority
over unperfected security interests, over the interests of lien creditors,
and over the interests of unsecured creditors.185 The trustee as
garnishor was at most some kind of lien creditor and was therefore
174. Id. § 9-327(3).
175. Id. § 9-327(4).
176. 776 N.W.2d 201 (Neb. 2009).
177. Id. at 205.
178. Id. at 203.
179. Id. at 203-04.
180. Id. at 204. Even after the garnishment summons was served, the bank continued to
honor checks drawn by the debtor on the account based on the knowledge that the debtor had
recently commenced a large construction project, the success of which would increase the bank's
chances of repayment. Myers, 776 N.W.2d at 204.
181. Id. at 207.
182. Id. at 204.
183. Id. at 208.
184. Id. at 207.
185. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201(a) (affording secured parties priority over other creditors unless the
U.C.C. provides otherwise), 9-317 (a)(2) (giving perfected secured parties priority over lien cred-
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subordinate to the perfected security interest of the depository
bank.186 Because the debtor was in default to Charter West, the latter
had the right to enforce its security interest in the debtor's account by
applying the account balance to the secured obligation. 87
The Nebraska Supreme Court further held Charter West had not
waived its security interest by continuing to honor some checks drawn
on the deposit account even after the debtor's default.188 The bank
was allowed to make "a calculated business decision" to try to keep
Gencon afloat in the hopes that it could revive its failing business. 89
In addition, Charter West was permitted to ignore the garnishment
summons because, in essence, all of the funds in the debtor's deposit
account were subject to the bank's superior security interest. 90
Until relatively recently, security interests in deposit accounts were
outside the scope of Article 9 and governed by non-U.C.C. law. 191 By
bringing such transactions within Article 9, the drafters hoped to bring
the benefits of the Code's straightforward and uniform scheme to the
creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in deposit
accounts. 192 At the same time, the drafters recognized that the his-
toric expectations of depository banks necessitated a carefully drawn
set of specialized rules to sort out the priorities among the various
claimants to this unique form of collateral. 93
E. Perfection of Security Interests in Fixtures: Chattel and
Fixture Filings
As discussed earlier, to perfect security interests under Article 9,
secured parties normally must file financing statements in the Secre-
itors), 9-322(a)(2) (providing for priority of perfected security interests over unperfected security
interests).
186. See Myers, 776 N.W.2d at 203 (observing that the trustee was seeking to enforce a judg-
ment received by one of debtor's unsecured creditors).
187. Id. at 206. See also U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(4) (stating that after default, a secured party that is
the depository bank "may apply the balance of the deposit account to the obligation secured by
the deposit account").
188. Myers, 776 N.W.2d at 207.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 207-08.
191. Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit Ac-
counts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 968 (1999).
192. See Luize E. Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing into Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 MnNr. L. REV. 899, 960-68 (1984)
(noting the benefits of bringing deposit accounts fully into Article 9).
193. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of
UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1364-67 (1999) (dis-
cussing disagreements among the drafters about whether to include deposit accounts within Ar-
ticle 9, given the numerous unique issues surrounding them).
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tary of State's office (or equivalent central filing office) in the state
where the debtor is located. 194 One of the important exceptions to
this general rule involves perfection of security interests in fixtures.
Fixtures span real and personal property and can been described as
real property that starts out life as a chattel and could become a chat-
tel once again.195 Article 9 allows secured parties with security inter-
ests in fixtures to make an ordinary chattel filing or to make a fixture
filing in the real estate records. 196 Each type of filing perfects the se-
curity interest but gives the secured party priority over different com-
peting claimants. 197
In a recent bankruptcy decision, a court apparently misunderstood
the distinction between chattel perfection and fixture filings and held
that the secured party holding a security interest in a fixture was un-
perfected as against the trustee in bankruptcy. 198 In Troutt, the debt-
ors had entered into a home improvement contract and had signed a
security agreement with Energy Doctor of Illinois, LLC. Under the
contract, Energy Doctor was to install an energy guard in the debtors'
house and retained a security interest in the guard until full payment
by the debtors. 199 Energy Doctor assigned the contract to American
General Financial Services, Inc.200
Later the debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and
treated American's claim as unsecured.201 American objected to con-
firmation of the debtors' plan and filed a secured claim. 20 2 The debt-
ors asserted that the secured party had not filed either a conventional
U.C.C. financing statement in the chattel records or a fixture filing in
the real estate records.20 3 Without any filing, the secured party would
hold only an unperfected security interest subject to avoidance under
194. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-310(a), 9-501(a)(2).
195. See Mayfair House Ass'n v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 07-80628-CIV-HURLEY, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66456, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2008) (discussing transformation of a chattel to a
fixture); Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Capital Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 549, 553-54
(W.D.N.C. 1996) (discussing removable status of trade fixtures); Columbia County v. Kelly, 548
P.2d 163, 167 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (citing FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 806
(1964) for the proposition that a fixture is "real property with a chattel past and the fear of a
chattel future.").
196. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501(a)(2), 9-502(a) (chattel filings); U.C.C. §§ 9-501(a)(1)(B), 9-502(b)
(fixture filings).
197. See id. §§ 9-317, 9-320, 9-322 (chattel filing priorities); id. § 9-334 (fixture filing
priorities).
198. In re Troutt, No. 09-40555, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2673 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2009).
199. Id. at *1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. In re Troutt, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2673, at *2.
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the "strong arm" clause of the federal Bankruptcy Code.2° American
countered by arguing that it held a purchase money security interest in
consumer goods, which was automatically perfected without filing.20 5
A properly perfected security interest cannot be avoided in bank-
ruptcy under the strong arm clause.20 6
In Troutt, the bankruptcy court began by determining that the col-
lateral, the energy guard, was a fixture under Illinois law. 20 7 Article 9
itself does not define "fixtures" but instead defers to non-U.C.C. state
law for determination of what is and what is not a fixture. 20 8 Illinois
law adopts the common three-part test for determining whether a
chattel has become a fixture: (a) attachment, (b) adaptation, and (c)
intention. 20 9 Under the attachment factor, courts typically look at
how firmly annexed the chattel is to the underlying real property. 210
The adaptation factor considers whether the chattel is uniquely
adapted to the property to which it is affixed, and the intention ele-
ment focuses on the annexing party's intent to make a permanent ac-
cession to the real estate. 211 Applying this test, the court found that
the energy guard was indeed a fixture: it was an insulating blanket cut
to conform to the homeowner's attic space and secured in such a way
that it could not be readily removed.21 2
Once having found that the energy guard was a fixture, the court in
Troutt then concluded that the secured party's security interest was
unperfected because of the creditor's failure to make a fixture filing in
the real estate records. 213  Once unperfected, the security interest
could be avoided altogether under the strong arm clause. Thus the
secured party was relegated to the lowly status of an unsecured
creditor.214
204. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006).
205. See In re Troutt, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2673, at *1-2 (citing U.C.C. § 9-309(1)).
206. See, e.g., Neilson v. Chang (In re First T.D. & Inv. Inc.), 253 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that trustee could not avoid perfected security interests under the strong arm clause).
207. In re Troutt, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2673, at *8.
208. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(41) (defining fixtures as "goods that have become so related to
particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law").
209. Nokomis Quarry Co. v. Dietl, 775 N.E.2d 669, 673 (I11. App. Ct. 2002); Harrisburg Cmty.
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Steapleton, 553 N.E.2d 76, 79 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
210. See, e.g., C-Plant Fed. Credit Union v. Heflin (In re Heflin), 326 B.R. 696, 702 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 2005) (holding that blinds were not fixtures because they could be easily removed);
City of Buffalo v. Michael, 209 N.E.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. 1965) (finding a sign to be a fixture be-
cause of its firm annexation to the building).
211. In re Troutt, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2673, at *6.
212. Id. at *6-7.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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One difficulty with the Troutt holding is the court's failure to con-
sider whether the secured party might have been perfected in the en-
ergy guard as a chattel. The fixture filing under Article 9 is designed
specifically to give the secured party priority over conflicting real es-
tate claimants. For example, the secured party takes a security inter-
est in the debtor's sprinkler system. The debtor then installs the
system on its farm in such a way that it becomes a fixture. The se-
cured party has the option under Article 9 to make a conventional
chattel filing, a fixture filing, or both. In the typical chattel filing, the
secured party will file a financing statement in the Secretary of State's
office in the state where the debtor is located. 215 For a fixture filing,
the secured party will file in the office where real estate mortgages are
filed in the county in which the land to which the fixture is annexed is
located.216 The chattel filing will give the secured party priority over
lien creditors, buyers, and other Article 9 secured parties. 217 The fix-
ture filing will give the secured party priority over all those parties
plus real estate claimants, such as holders of real property mortgages
on the land to which the fixture has been attached. 218
In Troutt, the creditor made no filing, but it claimed automatic
perfection as the holder of a purchase money security interest in con-
sumer goods.219 There is no question that the security interest was
purchase money-it was taken by the seller of the energy guard to
secure all or part of the purchase price.220 In addition, the energy
guard would qualify as a consumer good since the debtor purchased it
for "personal, family, or household purposes."' 221 Purchase money se-
curity interests in consumer goods are automatically perfected upon
attachment and do not require a filing. 222
Article 9 makes it clear, moreover, that a secured party who holds a
security interest in a fixture and perfects by "any method permitted by
this article" will have priority over the later holder of "a lien on the
real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings. ' 223 This
provision was intended to allow secured creditors to achieve priority
over the bankruptcy trustee, who has lien creditor status under the
215. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-501(a)(2).
216. Id. § 9-501(a)(1)(B).
217. Id. §§ 9-317(a)(2), (b); 9-322(a).
218. Id. § 9-334(d), (e).
219. In re Troutt, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2673, at *1-2.
220. U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b).
221. Id. § 9-102(a)(23).
222. Id. § 9-309(1).
223. Id. § 9-334(e)(3).
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Bankruptcy Code.224 Therefore, even though the energy guard was a
fixture under state law, the secured party's automatic perfection
should have afforded it priority over the trustee in bankruptcy. It is
not too surprising that the court did not adopt this line of reasoning.
Article 9 has an entire provision devoted to fixture priorities,225 and
that manner of statutory drafting creates the illusion that all security
interests in fixtures require a fixture filing for priority over any com-
peting claimants.
Transactional lawyers are known for their caution, and certainly,
caution dictates that secured parties holding security interests in
equipment items that might be classified as fixtures should file both a
conventional U.C.C. chattel financing statement and a fixture financ-
ing statement. It is important to remember that each type of financing
statement requires particular information (e.g., a fixture filing must
include a description of the real property to which the fixture is an-
nexed), 226 and each is filed in a particular office.227 Given the rela-
tively modest cost of filing,228 use of a "belt and suspenders" is highly
recommended where fixtures are concerned.
III. PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS: DISPUTES AMONG
COMPETING CLAIMANTS
The name of the game for the Article 9 secured creditor is perfec-
tion of its security interest, which, in most cases, leads to priority over
competing claimants to the same property of the debtor.229 The re-
ward for the secured party that goes to the trouble of taking and
perfecting a security interest in particular assets of the debtor is the
ability to trump most other competitors in the fight for the debtor's
property. On the other hand, in a number of settings, Article 9 gives
the competitors priority over even a perfected secured party for vari-
224. Id. § 9-334 cmt. 9.
225. See U.C.C. § 9-334 (entitled "Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures and Crops").
226. See id. § 9-502(a) (listing requirements for content of financing statements), (b) (provid-
ing for additional information for fixture filings).
227. See id. § 9-501(a)(2) (mandating central filing for most financing statements), (1) (requir-
ing fixture filings to be filed in "the office designated for the filing or recording of a record of a
mortgage on the related real property").
228. See, e.g., Texas Secretary of State, Uniform Commercial Code Fees, http://www.sos.state.
tx.us/ucc/forms/feeschedule.pdf (listing a filing fee of $15 for paper financing statements of two
pages or less and $5 or electronic financing statements regardless of length).
229. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201(a) (affording secured parties priority over other creditors unless the
U.C.C. provides otherwise), 9-317(a)(2) (giving perfected secured parties priority over lien credi-
tors), 9-322(a)(2) (providing for priority of perfected security interests over unperfected security
interests).
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ous policy reasons.2 30 As several recent cases reveal, these pro-com-
petitor provisions do not always disturb the vaunted position of the
senior secured party, who is often able to repel even the most deter-
mined competitors.
A. Maintaining Perfection and Priority in Proceeds
Article 9 secured parties desire to maintain attachment and perfec-
tion of their security interests not only in their original collateral but
also in proceeds generated from the disposition of their collateral.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code helpfully provides that
security interests continue in "identifiable proceeds" of original collat-
eral.231 Very often proceeds take the form of cash generated from the
sale of inventory or the collection of accounts.232 Cash proceeds con-
sist of "money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like. '233 Article 9 fur-
ther assists secured parties by continuing indefinitely perfection of
security interests in "identifiable cash proceeds" if the security interest
in the original collateral was properly perfected.234
Despite this pro-secured creditor treatment of cash proceeds, the
Code puts at least one significant limitation on the secured party's
ability to recover cash proceeds upon the debtor's default. If the
debtor transfers cash proceeds to certain good faith transferees, those
transferees take free of even perfected security interests.235 Article 9
takes the position that the traditional liquidity of cash and cash-like
instruments (i.e., checks) should trump the secured party's security in-
terest in those assets as proceeds: "Broad protection for transferees
helps to ensure that security interests ... do not impair the free flow
of funds. '236
The protection of good faith transferees was put to the test recently
in a federal bankruptcy decision involving cash payments to an indi-
vidual affiliated with the debtor.237 In Montagne, the secured party,
Ag Ventures, lent $457,000 to the debtor, Montagne Heifers, Inc.
230. See id. §§ 9-320(a) (providing that buyers in ordinary course of business take free of even
perfected security interests), 9-332 (allowing certain good faith transferees of money or funds
from deposit accounts to take free of security interests).
231. Id. § 9-315(a)(2). See also id. § 9-203(f) (providing that "attachment of a security interest
in collateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 9-315").
232. See id. § 9-102(a)(64)(A) (defining proceeds as, among other things, "whatever is ac-
quired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral").
233. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(9).
234. Id. § 9-315(c), (d)(2).
235. Id. § 9-332.
236. Id. cmt. 3.
237. Ag Venture Financial Services, Inc. v. Montagne (In re Montagne), 413 B.R. 148 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 2009). This bankruptcy case has resulted in several decisions over the past two years
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("MHI"), a dairy farm operation, in exchange for a security interest in
the debtor's "livestock" and "proceeds. 12 38 Michael Montagne was
the debtor's owner and president; his spouse, Diane Montagne, was
the debtor's treasurer. 239 Diane, as well as Michael, signed the secur-
ity agreement with Ag Ventures in November 2005 in her individual
and corporate capacities. 240 Over the course of the next two years,
Diane and Michael separated, Ag Ventures released Diane from lia-
bility for MHI's debt to it, and MHI sold a herd of milk cows for
$500,000.241 Shortly after the sale of the cows, on November 28, 2007,
MHI gave Diane a check for $240,000, part of the sale proceeds, and
Diane deposited the check into her attorney's client trust account.242
Ag Ventures brought a state court action against MHI, Michael, and
Diane, alleging conversion and fraudulent transfer of the $240,000
paid to Diane in November 2007.243 Michael filed a Chapter 12 bank-
ruptcy petition and, as debtor-in-possession, removed the state court
action to the federal bankruptcy court.244 The parties then filed cross-
motions for summary judgment on the conversion and fraudulent
transfer claims. 245 In defending the conversion claim, Diane asserted
that the secured party could not bring an action for conversion as it
did not have an "ownership interest" in the cash proceeds from the
sale of the cows. 246 The court rejected that argument, noting that be-
cause the corporate debtor was in default, Ag Ventures, which held a
perfected priority security interest in livestock, had a present right to
the proceeds from the sale of its collateral. 247 The court also found
that money, although not traditionally a chattel at common law, con-
stitutes property that may be the subject of a conversion claim.248
Having found that Ag Ventures was entitled to bring a conversion
claim with respect to the livestock proceeds, the court went on to find
that Diane had interfered with the secured party's right to immediate
possession of the proceeds and thus could be held liable for conver-
concerning the transfer of funds to Diane Montagne, but the holding in the original case remains
valid.
238. Id. at 151.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 152.
242. Montagne, 413 B.R. at 152.
243. Id. at 151.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 154.
247. Montagne, 413 B.R. at 154-56.
248. Id. at 157.
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sion unless protected by a viable defense. 249 The court held that Di-
ane's substantial exercise of dominion and control over the proceeds
and her refusal to release any of them to the secured party constituted
substantial interference with Ag Venture's rights. 250 In addition, Di-
ane knew that the money in question came from the sale of the cows
and that Ag Ventures had a security interest in the cows. 25 1 Even if
she thought mistakenly that her claim to the funds was superior to the
secured party's, she could still be liable for conversion under Vermont
law.25
2
Despite the validity of the basic conversion claim, however, Diane
would be shielded from liability if she qualified for protection under
the "good faith transferee" defense of U.C.C. section 9-332. That sec-
tion provides that a transferee of money or deposit account funds
takes free of security interests "unless the transferee acts in collusion
with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. '253 This
provision, of course, is highly protective of transferees of cash and
allows secured parties to recover their cash proceeds only from palpa-
bly "bad actors. ' 254 The Article 9 drafters recognized that in creating
this standard, they would shield transferees who knew that the funds
transferred to them were subject to perfected security interests.2 55
Nonetheless, policies supporting the "free flow of funds" and the "fi-
nality" of completed transactions dictate that the transferees be
protected. 256
In assessing whether Diane in fact acted in collusion with the corpo-
rate debtor, MHI, in receiving the check for $240,000 from the live-
stock sale, the court turned to section 876 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which sets forth three alternative tests for collusion:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he-
249. Id. at 157-59.
250. Id. at 158.
251. Id.
252. See Montagne, 413 B.R. at 158 n.6 (citing P.F. Jurgs & Co. v. O'Brien, 629 A.2d 325, 329
(Vt. 1993)).
253. U.C.C. § 9-332(a), (b).
254. Id. § 9-332 cmt. 4.
255. The pre-2001 version of Article 9 did not directly address the issue of transfers of encum-
bered proceeds to third parties, but one of the Official Comments suggested that only transfer-
ees who received funds in the ordinary course of business would be protected. U.C.C. § 9-306
cmt. 2(c) (1999). Courts applying this Comment sometimes found that a transferee's knowledge
of the security interest and/or of prejudice to the secured party would be enough to deprive the
transfer of ordinary course status. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504
F.2d 998, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1974); HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley Bank & Trust, 712 N.E.2d
952, 958 (Ind. 1999).
256. U.C.C. § 9-332 cmt. 3.
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(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other
so as to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tor-
tious result and his own conduct, separately considered, consti-
tutes a breach of duty to the third person.257
Once having identified this standard, however, the court held that the
record was "not sufficiently developed" on either legal or factual mat-
ters "for the Court to determine whether § 9-332(a) applies in the first
instance and, if it does, whether there was collusion." 25 The court
thus granted the creditor's motion for summary judgment on estab-
lishment of the basic claim for conversion and denied Diane's motion
for summary judgment based on the transferee defense, "subject to
her right to present evidence and further argument on the merits of
this defense. '259
Certainly, the court in Montagne was correct in ruling that the se-
cured party had established the basic requisites for conversion. Diane
had clearly exercised dominion and control over the creditor's cash
proceeds although she may have done so in the belief that her rights
were superior. Regarding its comments on the transferee defense, the
court seems to be on somewhat shakier ground. The court's language
in denying Diane's motion for summary judgment suggests that she
has the burden of proof with respect to all elements of the transferee
defense under U.C.C. section 9-332, including the collusion ele-
ment.260 One could argue that, at a minimum, a party such as Diane
should be required to prove that she is indeed a transferee of some
kind, such as a purchaser, donee, or judgment creditor. But that ele-
ment normally will have been established as part of the creditor's con-
version claim-i.e., that the converter received funds subject to the
secured party's security interest.
Beyond the mere fact of the transfer, however, it is unclear under
the statute who has the burden of establishing the collusion element.
Does the transferee bear the burden of showing that she was not act-
ing in collusion with the debtor, or does the secured party have the
burden of proving that the transferee was acting in collusion? The
257. See Montagne, 413 B.R. at 160 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876
(1979)).
258. Id. at 160.
259. Id. at 161.
260. See id. at 161 (denying her motion for summary judgment "at this time, subject to her
right to present evidence and further argument on the merits of this defense.").
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wording of section 9-332 suggests that the secured party has the bur-
den of establishing collusion-transferees of money take free of secur-
ity interests unless they act "in collusion with the debtor in violating
the rights of the secured party. '261 That phraseology seems to indi-
cate the drafters' intent to protect all transferees of funds unless the
creditor steps forward and shows some kind of collusive activity be-
tween the debtor and the transferee.
Possibly, the court's inclination to place the burden of proving the
transferee "defense" on Diane stemmed from her status as an insider.
She was the former treasurer of the debtor corporation and the es-
tranged spouse of the debtor's president.262 When she knowingly re-
ceived a proceeds check from the debtor, it is natural to assume that
she was somehow in cahoots with the debtor to evade the secured
party's proper claim to those proceeds. On the other hand, the se-
cured party had previously released her from all liability on the debt,
and she might have assumed that she was permitted to receive the
monies in question. In any event, the court (and the statute itself)
should probably have clarified its seeming choice to place the burden
of proving lack of collusion on the transferee.
Secured parties are always scrambling to keep control over cash
proceeds that can easily disappear into the hands of good faith trans-
ferees. One caution that emerges from the Montagne case is that se-
cured parties with security interests in inventory or farm products
should insist that in any large-scale sale of collateral, the debtor ask
the buyer to make out its check jointly to the debtor and the secured
party. This practice can go a long way towards ensuring that debtors
do not dissipate the creditor's proceeds before the creditor knows that
they even exist.
B. Priority between Secured Parties and Buyers in Ordinary
Course of Business
In the world of Article 9, the senior perfected secured party reigns
supreme and will have priority over most competing claimants to the
debtor's property.263 One exception to that general rule is the buyer
in ordinary course of business ("BIOCOB"), who takes free of even
perfected security interests.264 In a recent federal district court case,
the court tackled the issue of what it takes to be a BIOCOB in a situa-
261. U.C.C. § 9-332(a).
262. Montagne, 413 B.R. at 151.
263. See U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (providing that "a security agreement is effective according to its
terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.").
264. Id. § 9-320(a).
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tion where the buyer had not yet taken physical possession of the col-
lateral at the time of the debtor's default and concluded that the buyer
in question was not a BIOCOB.265
Under Article 9, a buyer in the ordinary course of business, "other
than a person buying farms products from a person engaged in farm-
ing operations, takes free of a security interest created by the buyer's
seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of
its existence. '2 66 The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is
defined in U.C.C. Article I as "a person that buys goods in good faith,
without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person
in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person . . . in the
business of selling goods of that kind. ' 267 Reading sections 9-320(a)
and 1-201(b)(9) together reveals that one can be a BIOCOB if one
knows merely that the property purchased is subject to a perfected
security interest but not if one knows that the sale violates some term
of the seller's security agreement with the secured party.268 The pur-
pose of the BIOCOB rule is to facilitate sales transactions between
the debtor and its customers. If the debtor's customers can buy from
the debtor freely, without having to worry about security interests, the
debtor is likely to sell more inventory, receive more cash, and pay
down the debt to the secured party more quickly than if the rule al-
lowed secured parties to follow their security interests into the buyer's
hands.269
In the Sunbelt Grain case, Security State Bank held a perfected se-
curity interest in Sunbelt's accounts, inventory, equipment, instru-
ments, farm products, and other assets.2 70 In May 2007, Sunbelt
agreed to sell Whitham Farms Feedyard five lots (500,000 bushels) of
#2 yellow corn to be delivered in various shipments over several
months beginning in December 2007.271 On November 1, 2007, Whi-
tham paid Sunbelt $2,099,750 for the entire order.272 On November
265. Speth v. Whitham Farms Feedyard, L.P. (In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC), 427 B.R. 896
(D. Kan. 2010).
266. U.C.C. § 9-320(a).
267. Id. § 1-201(b)(9) (2001). That provision also defines an "ordinary course" transaction as
a sale comporting "with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the
seller is engaged or with the seller's own usual or customary practices." Id. Further, "[olnly a
buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under
Article 2 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business." Id.
268. Id. § 9-320 cmt. 3.
269. In re Darling's Homes, Inc., 46 B.R. 370, 377 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985).
270. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 900.
271. Id.
272. Id.
[Vol. 9:169
BEWITCHED, BOTHERED AND BEWILDERED
19, 2007, Whitham ordered an additional 80,000 bushels of corn from
Sunbelt and paid $326,400 for this order on November 20, 2007.273
In December 2007, Sunbelt went into default under its security
agreement with the Bank. 274 The Bank commenced state law foreclo-
sure proceedings against Sunbelt and ultimately filed an involuntary
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Sunbelt in February 2008.275
The Chapter 7 trustee sold Sunbelt's existing grain inventory and
brought an adversary action to determine the distribution of $3.875
million in proceeds from the sale of grain at Sunbelt's facility.276 The
Bank claimed priority to $3.2 million of the proceeds; Whitham
claimed priority to $2.2 million.277 The Bank asserted priority based
on its properly perfected security interest whereas Whitham argued
that its interest was superior under the BIOCOB rule or the doctrine
of equitable subordination.278 The bankruptcy judge gave summary
judgment in favor of the Bank, holding that Whitham was not a BI-
OCOB, that the doctrine of equitable subordination did not apply,
and that therefore the Bank's perfected security interest had priority
in the proceeds. 279 Whitham appealed. 280
On appeal, the federal district court did not delve into issues of
good faith, knowledge, or ordinary course status, but instead focused
on whether Whitham was a "buyer" within the meaning of the
Code. 281 The court observed that over the years, courts have ex-
amined five possible points in time at which a party to a sales transac-
tions becomes a "buyer" under the U.C.C.: (1) the date of the initial
contract; (2) the date the goods are identified to the contract; (3) the
date title passes to the buyer; (4) the date the buyer gets delivery; and
(5) the date the buyer accepts the goods.282 In 1999, however, the
U.C.C. drafters amended the definition of BIOCOB in section 1-
201(b)(9) to clarify that "[o]nly a buyer that takes possession of the
goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under Article
2 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. ' 283 That amendment
to Article 1 was part of the overall revision of Article 9, which became
273. Id. at 901.
274. Id.
275. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 901-02.
276. Id. at 902.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 902.
281. Id. at 903-05.
282. Id. at 903 (citing Daniel v. Bank of Hayward, 425 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Wis. 1988)).
283. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2001).
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effective in most states, including Kansas, on July 1, 2001.284 In apply-
ing this amendment, the court in Sunbelt Grain noted that Whitham
did not argue that it had a right to recover the grain under Article 2,
only that it had "possession" of the grain at the time of the debtor's
default.285 Because Whitham did not have actual possession of the
corn, it was constrained to argue that it had "constructive
possession. '286
Finding a lack of Kansas case law on the issue of constructive pos-
session in civil cases, the federal district court turned to decisions from
other states and found that those decisions suggested that identifica-
tion of goods to the contract is a fundamental requirement for con-
structive possession.287 The court stated that even where the buyer
has paid for the goods, identification of specific goods to the contract
is essential to establishing constructive possession. 288 As the court
noted, identification of goods to a contract occurs "when the contract
is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing and identified" or
"if the contract is for the sale of future goods.., when the goods are
shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to
which the contract refers. '289 In one of Article 2's Official Comments,
the drafters further specify that the "mere making of the contract with
reference to an undivided share in an identified fungible bulk is
enough under subsection (a) to effect an identification if there is no
explicit agreement otherwise. ' 290 Based on this Comment, the court
then concluded that the corn had not been identified to the contract
between Sunbelt and Whitham because the original contract did not
identify a "fungible bulk" of corn in which Whitham would have an
undivided share.291 Consequently, Whitham did not attain BIOCOB
status, and the Bank's perfected security interest had priority over
Whitham's interest. 292
284. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 904.
285. Id. at 905 n.22.
286. Id. at 905.
287. Id. at 906.
288. See id. (stating that "without identification the buyer can have no legitimate claim to
possess or control the goods.").
289. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 906 (citing Kansas's version of U.C.C. § 2-
501(a), (b)).
290. U.C.C. § 2-501 cmt. 5 (amended 2003).
291. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 906-07.
292. The court also rejected Whitham's assertion of priority over the Bank based on the doc-
trine of equitable subordination. The court held that Whitham had not alleged facts that would
support a finding of conduct by the Bank amounting to "fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching
or spoliation, or moral turpitude." Id. at 907-09.
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One interesting facet of the Sunbelt Grain case is the buyer Whi-
tham's failure to argue that it had the "right to recover the goods from
the seller under Article 2" and thus qualified as a BIOCOB on that
basis.293 Buyers may obtain possession of goods in a seller's hands in
a number of ways under Article 2.294 Under the method most rele-
vant to this case, the buyer may recover goods from its seller if the
buyer had paid all or part of the purchase price of goods identified to
the contract and "the seller becomes insolvent within 10 days after
receipt of the first installment on their price. '295 In Sunbelt Grain, the
buyer Whitham prepaid the grain order on November 1 and Novem-
ber 19, 2007, and by December 7, 2007, the seller Sunbelt was in de-
fault to the Bank, which shut down Sunbelt's line of credit.296
Conceivably, Sunbelt became insolvent within ten days after Whi-
tham's November 1 or November 19 payment.
Even so, Whitham would still have had to show that the corn had
been identified to the contract, and the court found that it had not.
But one can quarrel with the court's interpretation of identification to
the contract as necessitating that the parties have identified a "fungi-
ble bulk" in their original contract. Identification of goods to a con-
tract can occur at any time after contract formation. The record
showed that as of November 19, 2007, Sunbelt had taken in 1.467 mil-
lion bushels of corn though it was not established how much of that
corn was actually on hand on that date. 297 By December 14, 2007,
Sunbelt "confirmed that Whitham's corn was in Sunbelt's inven-
tory. '298 Perhaps by strengthening the record, the buyer Whitham
could have persuaded the court that Sunbelt had identified the corn to
the Whitham contract and that Sunbelt's insolvency had occurred
within the time period required by section 2-502.
Whitham made a fatal mistake in prepaying the entire order of corn
well in advance of the first delivery, especially since the various seg-
ments of the order were to be delivered over a five-month period. If
Whitham had any hint of Sunbelt's financial weakness, it should have
paid in installments and demanded delivery upon tender of each in-
stallment. Alternatively, if Sunbelt was going to use Whitham's pay-
ment to acquire corn on the open market, then Whitham should have
taken a purchase money security interest in the corn and assured itself
293. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2001) (defining buyer in ordinary course of business).
294. See U.C.C. §§ 2-502(1)(b); 2-716(1), (3) (amended 2003) (affording buyers a right of re-
plevin or specific performance).
295. Id. § 2-502(1)(b).
296. In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 900-01.
297. Id. at 901 n.6.
298. Id. at 901.
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of a superpriority by complying with Article 9's requirements. 299 Whi-
tham trusted its seller and, as a result, received less than one-tenth of
the grain for which it paid. 300
C. Priorities between Secured Parties and Non-BIOCOB
Transferees of Collateral
Secured lenders are always concerned about the possibility of losing
their security interests if the debtor transfers collateral to a third party
without permission. Article 9, however, helpfully provides that a se-
curity interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale or other
disposition of the collateral "unless the secured party authorized the
disposition free of the security interest."'301 In other words, even
though the debtor transfers collateral to a third party buyer, the secur-
ity interest remains attached to the collateral unless the secured party
voluntarily gives up its security interest. A recent Third Circuit opin-
ion faced the issue of whether the secured party's passive acquies-
cence in the debtor's disposition of collateral could amount to an
implied authorization of the "disposition free of the security interest"
and concluded that it could not.30 2
In Jersey Tractor, the debtor Jersey granted a security interest in all
of its assets to Wawel Bank as collateral for a loan in 2002.303 The
Bank perfected by filing financing statements in the appropriate pub-
lic offices.30 4 As part of its security agreement with the Bank, the
debtor was prohibited from selling its accounts receivable for less than
their full face value without the secured party's permission.30 5 In
2003, however, the debtor entered into a factoring agreement with
Yale Factors, LLC, whereby it agreed to assign all of its accounts re-
299. See U.C.C. § 9-324(b) (affording a secured party holding a purchase money security in-
terest in inventory a superpriority over earlier inventory secured parties provided that a proper
financing statement is filed and individual authenticated notification to prior inventory secured
parties is given before the debtor has possession of the inventory). Although the collateral in-
volved in this case was corn, it would have been classified as inventory, not farm products, be-
cause farm products include only crops and livestock in possession of a farmer. Id. § 9-
102(a)(34). The debtor in this case operated a grain storage facility and was not involved in
"raising, cultivating, propagating, fattening, grazing, [or] any other farming ... operation." Id.
§ 9-102(a)(35).
300. See In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, LLC, 427 B.R. at 901 (stating that the debtor delivered
only 57,000 bushels of corn out of the 580,000 bushels promised).
301. U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).
302. Wawel Savings Bank v. Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc. (In re Jersey Tractor Trailer
Training, Inc.), 580 F.3d 147, 154-55 (3rd Cir. 2009).
303. Id. at 150.
304. Id.
305. See id. (noting that the debtor agreed that it would not "settle any account for less than
its full value without [Wawel's] written permission.").
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ceivable to Yale in exchange for 70 percent of their face value (less an
8.5 percent fee). 306 Starting in November 2003, Yale bought Jersey's
accounts by wiring funds to an account that Wawel maintained at the
Federal Home Loan Bank of New York ("FHLB") to receive wire
transfers on behalf of customers, such as Jersey.30 7 After receiving a
wire transfer from Yale, FHLB would notify Wawel by phone, by fac-
simile, by letter, and by a daily update on wires received.308 The fax
and letter notifications clearly indicated that the party originating the
wire transfers was "Yale Factors NJ LLC. '30
9
In December 2005, Jersey notified Wawel's president of its factoring
arrangement with Yale. 310 Wawel objected, and Jersey sought to end
the arrangement by informing Yale in January 2006 that it would not
be renewing the factoring agreement when it expired on March 20,
2006.311 On April 6, 2006, Jersey filed a voluntary petition for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.312 Wawel filed an
action for declaratory relief against Jersey and Yale seeking to estab-
lish its right to the proceeds of Jersey's accounts receivable. 313 The
parties agreed that the general Article 9 priority rule of "first-to-file-
or-perfect" afforded Wawel priority over Yale in the accounts. 314 Yale
argued, however, that Wawel had authorized the sale of the accounts
free of Wawel's security interest and thus had waived its interest.
315
The bankruptcy court found in favor of Wawel, holding that neither
the Bank nor its president had actual notice of the factoring agree-
ment with Yale until Jersey specifically told Wawel's president about it
in December 2005.316 Because Wawel was unaware of the sale of ac-
counts to Yale, it could not have authorized the sale free of Wawel's
security interest. 317 Yale appealed the decision to the federal district
court, and that court affirmed. 318 Yale pursued a further appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.319
306. Id. at 150.
307. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 151.
308. Id. at 151 n.7.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 151.
311. Id.
312. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 149.
313. Id.
314. See id. (citing New Jersey's version of U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1)).
315. See id. at 153-54 (citing U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1)).
316. Id. at 149.
317. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 152.
318. Id. at 149.
319. Id.
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In affirming the lower courts' decisions, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit first noted that whether Wawel explicitly or implic-
itly waived its security interest in Jersey's accounts receivable was a
factual issue to be evaluated under the clearly erroneous standard. 320
Next, the court rejected Yale's argument that because Wawel's secur-
ity agreement with Jersey did not expressly prohibit the sale of collat-
eral, Wawel thereby waived its security interest. 321 The court
observed that the security agreement did in fact restrict the debtor's
ability to dispose of accounts for less than their full face value.322
The court also found that Wawel had not implicitly waived its secur-
ity interest in the debtor's accounts through its course of dealing with
the debtor.323 Departing from the bankruptcy court's decision on this
issue, the court of appeals was "receptive" to Yale's argument that
Wawel, through its officers, had actual knowledge that Jersey was
making transfers to and receiving payments from a factor.324 Wawel's
officers clearly received notification of Yale's wire transfers on an
ongoing basis, and their awareness of the transfers could be imputed
to their principal, Wawel. 325 As a consequence, the court assumed
that "Wawel was aware that JTIT was involved with a factor-and
thus was selling its accounts receivable." 32 6
Notwithstanding its assumption that Wawel knew of Jersey's sale of
its accounts, the court held that Wawel never gave up its security in-
terest.327 Under the pre-revision version of U.C.C. section 9-
315(a)(1), some courts held that secured parties impliedly waived
their security interests where they were aware of the debtor's re-
peated sale of collateral without permission and never objected to the
practice.328 But the pre-revision case law was by no means uniform,
and a number of courts found that the secured party had not waived
its security interest simply because it knew of the debtor's unautho-
rized disposition of collateral and remained silent. 329 The U.C.C. Per-
manent Editorial Board also weighed in on the question and stated
that a secured party waived its security interest only where it specifi-
320. Id. at 154 n.14.
321. Id. at 154.
322. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 154.
323. Id. at 154-55.
324. Id. at 154.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 154.
328. See former U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1999); LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917,
923 (10th Cir. 2004); Neu Cheese Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1270, 1273 (8th Cir.
1987).
329. See, e.g., J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Crites, 851 F.2d 309, 313 (10th Cir. 1988).
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cally "authorized the disposition, by agreement or otherwise, free and
clear of the security interest.' '330
Noting that Revised Article 9 expressly referenced P.E.B. Com-
mentary Number 3 in the Official Comments to new section 9-
315(a)(1), the Tenth Circuit in Jersey Tractor held that passive acqui-
escence by the secured party of repeated sales of collateral by the
debtor did not waive the creditor's security interest.331 A secured
party does not so easily give up its bargained for security interest:
"Because § 9-315(a)(1) does not require a secured party to take action
to preserve its security interest, inaction alone may not lead to a find-
ing of implied authorization. ' 332 To be meaningful, a security interest
must travel with the collateral wherever it goes, unless the Code pro-
vides otherwise or the secured party expressly releases its security
interest.333
Having lost on the waiver issue, Yale then argued that it qualified
for protection as a holder in due course or as a purchaser of instru-
ments.334 Although the lower courts had found that Yale lacked the
good faith necessary to qualify for protection as a holder in due course
or purchaser of instruments, the court vacated that finding and re-
manded the case for further factual findings on the issue of good
faith.335 The interesting twist is the apparent assumption that the in-
voices for the accounts receivable qualified as negotiable instruments
under Articles 3 and 9.336 Generally, accounts are considered pure
intangibles because they are not normally evidenced by an indispensa-
ble writing.337 In Jersey Tractor, there is nothing in the facts to sug-
gest that the accounts in question were memorialized or embodied in
any kind of special writing that had the attributes of negotiability.
In sum, secured parties can ordinarily be assured that they can fol-
low their security interests in collateral transferred by their debtors to
third parties. It will take more than mere inattention or inaction for a
secured party to waive its security interest. At the same time, a pru-
330. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, P.E.B. COMMENTARY No. 3 (1990).
331. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 154-55.
332. Id. at 155.
333. See id. (citing 9B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, FREDERICK H. MILLER & NEIL B. COHEN,
HAWKLAND U.CC. SERIES § 9-315:1 (2008)).
334. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302(a) (defining holder in due course), 9-331(a) (reiterating the priority
of holders in due course over even perfected security interests), 9-330(d) (affording priority to
certain good faith purchasers of instruments).
335. In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d at 159.
336. Id. at 152.
337. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (stating that accounts do not include "rights to payment evi-
denced by chattel paper or an instrument").
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dent secured party should be alert to possible unauthorized disposi-
tions of collateral and call the debtor to account for such infractions of
the security agreement. It is always better to forestall possible
problems through reasonable monitoring of the debtor's activities
than to end up trying to fight off competing claimants in litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Intricately and beautifully designed, Article 9 in many ways has ac-
complished its goal of simplifying and clarifying secured transactions.
Originally formulated over half a century ago, it represented a vast
improvement over the archaic, cumbersome, and disparate laws that
covered secured transactions, many of them dating from the nine-
teenth century. Despite its elegance and clockwork construction, Ar-
ticle 9 has required several major revisions-its very complexity, as
well as the changing face of modern commerce, has necessitated sub-
stantial statutory modifications. Although the last major revision in
2001 addressed the primary issues that divided pre-revision courts, the
case law has continued to flow throughout the first decade of the new
millennium. Recently, in 2010, the drafters have proposed yet another
round of significant amendments to Article 9, a further grasp at the
ever elusive object of perfecting this complicated statutory creation.
Time will tell whether the drafters have moved closer to achieving that
goal.
This review of recent state and federal cases interpreting Article 9
reveals that while the courts often "get it right," they still fumble from
time to time. In addition, although secured creditors have been oper-
ating under the 2001 version of the statute for almost a decade, sur-
prisingly, they often make basic errors in perfecting their security
interests, monitoring their debtors, and assuring themselves of the se-
nior priority position. Given Article 9's firm stance in favor of se-
cured parties, it is hard for senior secured creditors not to "rule the
world," but unfortunately, sometimes by virtue of their own mistakes,
they do not.
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